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Likviditeetti ja anomaliat: tutkimus osakemarkkinoiden likviditeetistä ja sen vaikutuksesta 
momentum- ja value-sijoittamisen tuottoihin. 
 
Tutkielman tavoitteet 
 
Tutkimus syventyy yhteyteen osakemarkkinoiden likviditeetin ja kahden eniten tutkitun 
osakemarkkinoiden poikkeavuuden, momentum-ilmiön sekä value-ilmiön, välillä. Tavoitteena on 
lisätä tietoa aiheesta käyttäen päivittäistä osakemarkkinainformaatiota, sekä vahvistamaan 
edellisiä usein kuukausittaisella osakemarkkinainformaatiolla tehtyjä tuloksia. 
 
Lähdeaineisto 
 
Tutkimuksessa käytetään kahta data-kokonaisuutta. Ensimmäinen osa koostuu päivittäisestä   
NYSE osakemarkkinadatasta, joka on haettu CRSP-tietokannasta. Toisen osan muodostavat 
Kenneth Frenchin verkkosivuilta haetut Fama-French -tekijät. Aineiston pohjalta on muodostettu 
yhdeksän investointiportfoliota ja kuusi likviditeettitekijää. 
 
Tulokset 
 
Ensimmäisenä löydöksenä ilmenee positiivisten alphojen puuttuminen sekä momentum- että 
value-investointistrategioilta vuoden 2008 finanssikriisin jälkeisenä aikana. Toiseksi, 
likviditeettishokkien ja value-sijoittamisen tuottojen välillä ilmenee negatiivinen suhde, kun taas 
likviditeettishokkien ja momentum-sijoittamisen tuottojen välillä vallitsee positiivinen suhde. 
Kolmanneksi, ennustamattomat likviditeettishokit, toisin kuin ennustetut muutokset 
osakemarkkinoiden likviditeetissä, ennustavat tulevia momentum- ja value-investointituottoja. Ja 
viimeiseksi, positiivisilla likviditeettishokeilla on vahvempi vaikutus kuin negatiivisilla shokeilla, 
sekä tilastolliselta merkitykseltään että vahvuudeltaan, selitettäessä tulevia momentum- ja value-
sijoittamisen tuottoja. 
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1 Introduction 
 “Why does momentum load positively and value load negatively on liquidity risk?” – Asness, 
Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013). 
Ever since the development of the traditional views of expected stock returns around the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM)
1
 and the efficient market hypothesis (EMH)
2
, practitioners and 
academics have fiercely searched for market anomalies to either study them out of sheer academic 
interest or with profiteering purposes. At first, these hypotheses were found out to hold very well 
(Fama, 1970) but many current financial theories set limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), 
present long lasting anomalies (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and find evidence against the random 
walk in stock prices in general (e.g. Lo and MacKinlay, 1988). 
This study is motivated by recent findings by Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) who present 
persistent value and momentum return premium across a vast variety of asset classes and different 
markets. They find a significant link between liquidity risk and both momentum and value returns. 
This link forms the foundation for this study and focus is on the role that market liquidity plays in 
explaining the behavior of these two strong market anomalies: value effect
3
 and momentum effect
4
. 
The results are in line with the findings by Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) and find a 
negative relationship between stock market liquidity shocks and value investment returns, and a 
positive relationship between stock market liquidity shocks and momentum investment returns. 
These results are reached when studying the lagged daily effects from liquidity shocks. The positive 
liquidity shocks drive this effect more strongly than the negative shocks. 
                                                 
1
 Developed by Sharpe, W., 1964, Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk,  
Journal of Finance 19, 425-442, Lintner, J., 1965, The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments in 
stock portfolios and capital budgets, Review of Economics and Statistics 47, 13-37 and Treynor, J. (unpublished), 
(Breyley, R., Myers, S., Allen F.,  2008, Principles of corporate finance, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, Singapore.) 
2
 Developed and tested in the early 1960’s (by e.g. Fama, E., 1965, The behavior of stock-market prices, Journal of 
Business 38, 35-105) after the random walk findings in the stock markets by Kendal, M., 1953, The analysis of 
economic time series, part I. Prices, Journal of Royal Statistical Society 96, 11-25. 
3
 Value effect stands for the long lasting anomaly where assets returns are affected by its book-to-market ratio. 
4
 Momentum effect, founded by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), is the strongest and most persistent anomaly in financial 
markets. It stands for the effect that past performances have on expected returns of an asset. 
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1.1 Theoretical background 
The very foundations of the academic research in finance have been heavily influenced by the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
5
. The CAPM states that every asset’s cross sectional 
differences in expected returns should be explained purely by their betas (β).6 The CAPM offered a 
theoretical framework on how the assets should be priced based on their correlation with market 
returns. 
However, the empirical evidence showing different market anomalies started to build up. For 
example Banz (1981) presents that size also affects the stock market return in a way that can't be 
explained by the CAPM; and the findings from Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein 
(1985) present the book-to-market ratio to explain the cross section differences in stock markets. 
These results lead to the development of the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French, 
1993), where size and book-to-market ratio are added to the original CAPM. Later, the discovery of 
momentum investing returns (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and its ability to explain the cross 
sectional return differences for mutual fund returns (Carhart, 1997) lead to the inclusion of 
momentum returns as the fourth explanatory variable for asset returns. 
So why are the markets not perfect and different anomalies persist long after their discovery? One 
sound and robust explanation offered is the limits of arbitrage by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), which 
builds the theoretical framework where arbitrageurs are limited by the outside investor monitoring 
their performance. This framework clearly highlights the conclusion that some amount of arbitrage 
profits are needed for the arbitrage process to function properly and markets can never fully reach 
the theoretical perfect ideal levels. 
When we look at market anomalies, such as excess momentum and value investing profits, through 
these limits of arbitrage framework the possibility of time varying levels of anomaly profits can be 
                                                 
5
 See Introduction Chapter. 
6
 Beta (β) stands for the correlation coefficient from the CAPM regression                , where    stands for 
the expected return for the asset a,    stands for the risk-free rate of return and the    stands for the expected market 
returns. 
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seen. In this setting, when the arbitrageurs make their investment decisions, they should be 
concerned by the net profits after the trading costs. This would clearly build a theoretical link 
between the arbitrage returns and the ease of trading i.e. market liquidity. The changes in market 
liquidity should change the net profitability of arbitrage activity and thus limit the amount of the 
mispricing possible to arbitrage away as presented in Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
 
1.2 The Thesis’ contribution to Research  
The research broadens the results from Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) by demonstrating a 
similar negative relationship between liquidity shocks and value investment returns, and a positive 
relationship between liquidity shocks and momentum investment returns. The results from this 
research confirm these previous results using the post 2008 financial crisis data. 
Second, the study relates to Lee and Swaminathan (2000), who present that past trading volume 
predicts the magnitude and persistence of momentum returns. This study focuses on daily returns 
and therefore fills a clear gap for this area of research (ibid.) also, since the focus has usually been 
on the much longer run relations between momentum returns and trading volume (months and 
years). 
And third, the research focus on the post 2008 financial crisis period contributes to the findings by 
Daniel and Moskowitz (2012), who present a clear connection between market crashes and returns 
from momentum investment strategy, and Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Tong (2013), who show the 
decline in anomaly-based trading strategies such as momentum and value. For these reasons it 
seems important to study the connections between momentum and value investment returns and 
liquidity in post 2008 financial crisis environment in order to grasp a better understanding of these 
phenomena. 
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1.3 Overview of the results 
At first when studying the general profitability of momentum and value investment strategies, no 
abnormal returns are found during the studied, post 2008 financial crisis, period, i.e. neither of these 
strategies are able to obtain a positive alpha during this period. 
Next the research focuses on the role that overall market liquidity levels have on momentum and 
value returns. The positive relationship between momentum returns and market liquidity is obtained 
even throughout the preliminary testing and this relationship is found to strengthen as the testing 
advances. On the other hand, the relationship between value and market liquidity initially looks 
insignificant, but when further studied, is negative. 
The methodology moves from studying market liquidity levels, to the study of expected and 
unexpected changes in liquidity. This part demonstrates how unexpected changes in liquidity, but 
not the expected ones, affect momentum and value investment returns. The liquidity shocks 
correlate positively with momentum returns and negatively with value returns. 
These unexpected liquidity shocks are studied even further by using the dummy variable approach, 
where different liquidity shocks are divided into different dummy variable categories, to study the 
difference between positive and negative liquidity shocks. The positive liquidity shocks contribute 
much stronger to these results than the negative ones. 
The most important finding in general is the fact that liquidity and unexpected liquidity have a time 
varying effect on momentum and value returns. The initial reaction is rather low and the full effect 
is reached only after a small time lag. In momentum returns the strongest effect occurs one trading 
day later from the liquidity shock and with value returns three trading days after the liquidity shock. 
This slow moving effect highlights the importance of using daily data to study market anomalies 
and opens very interesting new doors for further studies. 
 
1.4 Structure of the study 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the previous literature on 
momentum and value anomalies, market liquidity, price reversals and transaction costs. Chapter 3 
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links previous findings together and introduces the two main hypotheses studied. Chapter 4 presents 
data and methodology. Chapter 5 presents the main findings and further robustness studies and 
finally Chapter 6 sums up the thesis. 
 
2 Literature review 
This chapter reviews the academic research on momentum and value investing strategies, liquidity 
and two other closely related subjects for this study (transaction costs and stock price reversals). 
The aim is to build a solid foundation for the hypothesis building by presenting widely the previous 
academic research and linking them tightly into the thesis in order to reflect the results thoroughly.  
 
2.1 Momentum 
“…strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks that have 
performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns over 3- to 12-month holding 
periods.” –Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
The first investment strategy presented is momentum investing. It is a widely used investing 
strategy where the investor takes a long position in assets that have performed well in the past and 
short position in the badly performing ones. There are many different ways of using this investing 
strategy and the academic literature on this subject is long and wide. This chapter aims to present 
the fundamental findings from this field, build an overall picture on the relevant academic literature 
and link the previous findings into this study. 
 
2.1.1 Early findings 
Earliest academic signs of abnormal momentum investment returns in stock markets are by Levy 
(1967) who discovers significant excess returns from buying stocks that are clearly higher than their 
past 27 week price average. These results are however later criticized by Jensen and Bennington 
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(1970) who claim these findings merely as results from extensive data mining
7
 and that the results 
cannot be generalized outside Levy's sample period. 
Another earlier result from long horizon momentum returns is presented by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985, 1987) who present stock market overreactions and find that during 3 to 5 year holding 
periods the shares that performed poorly in the past 3 to 5 years, out-performed in the next 3 to 5 
years.  The overreaction is presented as an over-response to new information where the extreme 
reaction is followed by correction to the opposite direction. However, these results have been 
criticized to be due to the systemic risk and size effect rather than actual overreaction (Chan 1988, 
Ball & Kothari 1989 etc.). 
The first really ground breaking and robust findings on abnormal momentum investing returns in 
stock markets come from Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). It presents significant positive returns from 
buying past winners and selling past losers with 3 to 12 month holding periods and no link between 
these returns and systemic risk or delayed returns of these stocks are found. Data in this study 
includes monthly stock returns from 1965 to 1989. There are 32 trading strategies used: look back 
periods of 1, 2, 3 or 4 quarters and hold periods of 1, 2, 3 or 4 quarters, and also the very same 16 
strategies using a one week waiting period before portfolio formation. This is done to avoid the bid-
ask spread, price pressure and lagged reaction. 
 
2.1.2 Persistence over time 
Later, Fama and French (1996) document, that momentum returns are indeed the only CAPM-
related anomaly which is unexplained by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. This is a 
major change in the way the momentum investing returns are seen. Their position is in a way 
promoted from a market anomaly, to an important pricing factor and later the four-factor model 
including the momentum effect has been widely used in the academic literature. 
These results emphasize one of the most fascinating elements of momentum returns, that unlike 
most of the anomalies in financial sector which vanish shortly after their discovery (e.g. Schwert , 
                                                 
7
 A falsely positive result resulting from massive amount of trials without any really robust causality behind the 
findings. 
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2003), momentum strategy has been found profitable long after its discovery (e.g. Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 2001 & 2002). Plenty of explanations have been offered to explain this anomaly (see e.g. 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Hong, Lim, 
and Stein, 2000; Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002; Grinblatt and Han, 2005; and Avramov and 
Chordia, 2006) but no real consensus between scholars exists and this clearly stresses the 
importance of further studies on this subject. 
Industry momentum, buying (selling) stocks from the best (worst) performed industry, is studied by 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). This study shows that an industry momentum component seems to 
explain large part of the momentum phenomenon seen in the stock markets. After adjusting the 
momentum to the industry momentum, the statistically significant momentum returns seem to 
vanish. These results are partly verified by Grundy and Martin (2001) where the industry 
momentum was found to contribute, but not to dominate, the stock market momentum returns. 
Return consistency, the frequency of positive or negative stock returns in the past, is looked into by 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) and Watkins (2003) who present this return consistency to 
contribute to the momentum investing returns. They document that stocks with high frequency of 
positive returns over the prior 6 or 12 months have higher future returns and stocks with high 
frequency of negative returns have lower future returns. 
The role of analyst coverage is studied by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) who find that momentum is 
weaker for the larger firms with stronger analyst cover. They argue that this can be caused by 
slower information diffusion. Both of these results are also confirmed by, for example, Gutierrez 
and Kelley (2008) using weekly data. These results are relevant to this study, since the stocks from 
the larger firms tend to also be the most liquid ones and this can actually be seen as a possible 
supporting evidence also for the role of stock liquidity. 
Gutierrez and Kelley (2008) study the weekly returns and find that despite the brief reversal in the 
first weeks, the returns for the 52 weeks following the extreme weekly returns are actually in the 
same direction as the extreme event, i.e. they found momentum effect from the weekly returns. 
These results are relevant to this thesis in two ways. First, the verification of momentum return 
findings from the weekly data raise a clear interest for studying even shorter periods (daily data 
within this thesis) and second, the first weeks’ reversal returns are taken into account in this study 
by adding a waiting period before portfolio formation to avoid the price reversal effect. 
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The need to include the waiting period is also emphasized by the findings from Chan (2003) who 
claims that market under-reacts to explicit news (publicly released firm specific news) and 
overreacts to implicit news (news only implied by the price change) and the study by Gutierrez and 
Kelley (2008) documenting the short reversal and longer momentum in both of these cases. 
Also the macro environment has been documented to affect the momentum as Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002) find no significant returns from momentum strategy during recessions but 
document large payoffs during the expansions. Similar results are reached by Avramov and Chordia 
(2006) who show how an optimizing investor can load on momentum on different phases of the 
economic cycle. These results highlight the need for studying the relations between momentum and 
value investing returns, and market liquidity during different economic conditions. 
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2007) document a connection between momentum and 
credit ratings. They find large and significant momentum in low-grade firms, but none among the 
high-graded firms. Their data consists of the years 1985 to 2003 and could be affected by the dot-
com bubble. Also, the momentum is stronger in firms with higher information uncertainty (Jiang, 
Lee and Zhang, 2005; and Zhang, 2006). All of these findings point out to the direction that the 
largest, most scrutinized and stable firms will suffer less from the momentum phenomenon, which 
clearly underlines the possibility of some third variable influencing to these profits. One of such 
factors could be market liquidity.    
 
2.1.3 Theoretical discussion 
Interesting theoretical models that build to explain momentum returns include Berk, Green and 
Naik (2002) who build a model that mimics firms’ investment decision processes with growth 
options and show by simulation that the dynamics of investment decisions can explain the 
documented success of contrarian and momentum investing. Also the model build by Kogan 
(2001), to explain the dynamics of irreversible investments, provides positive return persistence. 
Grinblatt and Han (2005) argue that the well known disposition effect should contribute to 
momentum, as investors hold losing shares too long and sell winners too early, it will lead to under-
reaction in both of the cases. Zhang (2006) on the other hand offers the psychological biases 
causing a misreaction to news as a potential explanation to momentum reactions. Many researches 
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build theoretical models that imply that rational learning can induce momentum and reversal in 
returns (Veronesi, 1999; Lewellen and Shanken, 2002; Brav and Heaton, 2002). 
The pure existence of cross sectional differences in the expected returns
8
 is one of the explanations 
offered for the existence of momentum phenomenon by Conrad and Kaul (1998). This study 
presents results that show momentum returns as mere results of buying stocks with higher expected 
returns according to efficient market hypothesis and selling the lowest ones. This explanation fits 
nicely in the perfect market hypothesis as all the profits will be results of excess risk taking. 
Unfortunately for those academics yearning for a perfect world, Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) break 
this bubble by showing that the results by Conrad and Kaul (1998) are inaccurate and in fact the 
momentum returns cannot be explained by just the cross sectional differences in the expected 
returns. 
Ahn, Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (2002) raise an interesting question about the weight 
that should be put on small trades made at possibly overvalued or undervalued prices. They argue 
that it could be possible to find the momentum effect purely due to the few uninformed investors 
trading on very low liquidity shares. This problem can be avoided by focusing the study on the 
more liquid stocks and rule out the most illiquid ones and this approach is followed in this thesis 
(see Chapter 4.1 Data). 
 
2.1.4 Time series momentum 
“Time series momentum represents one of the most direct tests of the random walk hypothesis” –
Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012). 
Time series momentum is quite similar in nature and can be (and should be) coexisting with its 
cross sectional counterpart. Unlike in cross sectional momentum where stocks are selected based on 
their past relative performance to other stocks, in the time series momentum strategy environment 
stocks performance is benchmarked to its own past performance. Intuitively these strategies can 
yield very similar possible portfolios because if a stock performs very well (poorly) related to its 
                                                 
8
 The fundamental factor in the field of finance is that assets differ in their riskiness to investors (i.e. correlate 
differently with market returns as presented in the CAPM introduced earlier) and thus differ in their expected returns. 
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own past performance, it will quite often do so also when compared to other stocks as well. Yet 
there are differences and the findings from this field greatly contribute to the overall picture for 
liquidity's role explaining momentum and value investing profits. 
Fama and French (1988), motivated by Summers (1986), reach fascinating findings in stock 
markets. They find a negative autocorrelation in industry and decile portfolios.  The 
autocorrelations become negative in a 2 year horizon and reach minimum values in 3-5 year 
horizons. On a longer period the correlation vanishes. The most astonishing part of these findings is 
the time period of their study, from 1926 to 1985, and the correlation persists for the whole 60 year 
period. Similar results from an even larger set of data is obtained by Poterba and Summers (1988) 
who show positive serial correlation in short horizons and negative on longer ones. Both of these 
results shed some light for the longer horizon stock returns and their possible autoregressional 
nature. 
Recent and quite astonishing findings by Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012) show significant 
time series momentum in equity index, currency, commodity and bond futures. Each of the studied 
58 instruments provide significant results and the portfolio of these instruments provides significant 
abnormal returns with little exposure to standard asset pricing factors and actually performs best 
during times of extreme market reactions. They document that for each instrument, the past 12 
month excess return is a positive predictor of future profits. They also find evidence that these 
profits are closely related to the trading activities of speculators and hedgers and speculators seem 
to profit at the expense of the hedgers. They decompose the momentum in these future instruments 
into the component coming from the spot markets and one from the roll yield coming from the 
shape of the futures curve. They find that both of these elements contribute to the time series 
momentum but only the spot price changes are linked by the long-term reversal effect. They find no 
evidence that the returns compensate the tail events, but rather the returns are largest when stock 
market reactions are the most extreme. 
Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012) have three slight differences compared to most studies on 
momentum. First, they find no evidence that illiquidity causes momentum, rather that it might have 
a small positive affect. Second, they find no significant relation between time series momentum and 
funding liquidity (between TED and TS-Momentum) or market volatility. Third, they find a 
significant relation between time series and cross sectional momentum but state that they are still 
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not the same thing. Very interestingly, they find that the correlation of time series momentum 
across different assets is stronger than the passive long positions on the same assets, which they 
claim implies a common component behind time series momentum which is not present in the 
underlying assets themselves. 
All in all, this study differs from the traditional momentum studies as it focuses on time-series 
momentum rather than the cross sectional one and also since the focus is on the future markets, it 
makes the comparison harder and the difference between spot and future markets statistical 
properties (Ahn, Boudoukh, Richardson, Whitelaw, 2002) can offer one explanation for the 
different results. 
 
2.1.5 Momentum and value 
A fundamentally different kind of study by Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) studies the 
global market portfolio of stocks, bonds, currencies and  commodities jointly and finds significant 
cross correlation between value strategy (and momentum strategy) between these global asset 
classes. They also document a negative correlation between momentum strategy and value strategy 
within and across these asset classes. They document a positive relation between liquidity risk and 
value and negative with liquidity risk and momentum, and claim that this may indicate that liquidity 
risk could be "an important common component of value and momentum" (ibid.). They argue for 
the limits of arbitrage as an important factor behind this phenomenon as momentum returns seem to 
be highest during times of low liquidity when trading costs are to be the largest and thus the net 
profits remain the same for arbitrageurs. 
The differences and similarities of liquidity proxies are nicely demonstrated by the Asness, 
Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013). First, they find only little correlation between different liquidity 
proxies. This offers the explanation why their results from the relationship between liquidity and 
momentum differ from some of the earlier results (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Sadka, 2006)
9
. 
Second, and much more interesting, result is that all of the liquidity proxies load negatively on the 
                                                 
9
 Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) also confirms the earlier results by using the same liquidity proxies and in 
those studies but reach to different results when using the wider range of liquidity estimators. 
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value returns and somewhat negatively on the momentum returns (Asness, Moskowitz and 
Pedersen, 2013). When these two results are combined it seems that even with the differences these 
liquidity proxies have they are all connected to the value and momentum effects by some larger 
underlining effect. One explanation offered by Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) is the 
restrictions that arbitrageurs may face during illiquid times and this explanation would also be in 
line with the limited arbitrage by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and slow moving capital by Mitchell, 
Pedersen and Pulvino (2007). 
 
2.2 Value 
"[The results] suggest that there is an economic story behind the size and book-to-market effects in 
average stock returns." -Fama and French (1993).  
The second market anomaly studied is value investing strategy, more specifically the book-to-
market effect
10
. This chapter briefly introduces the historical field from value investing and then 
discusses more deeply the previous findings related to momentum investing strategy and market 
liquidity. 
 
2.2.1 Brief history check 
"The book value of a common stock was originally the most important element in its financial 
exhibit." - Graham and Dodd (1934). 
Earlier academic literature presents several unique market anomalies based on different value 
investment strategies.  Basu (1977), for example, presents the findings that the stock portfolios with 
low P/E -ratios
11
 manage to provide higher absolute and risk adjusted earnings than the portfolios 
                                                 
10
 Book-to-market effect stands for the effect that those stocks with high market values of equity compared to their book 
value of equity (growth stocks) are outperformed by those stocks with low market values of equity compared to the 
book value of equity (value stocks). 
11
 P/E -ratio stands for the price-earnings ratio calculated by dividing the market price of the share with its earnings per 
share. 
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with high P/E -ratios. This relation is confirmed by Jaffe, Keim and Westerfield (1989) and also, 
that also the size effect
12
 contributes to these results which also confirm the earlier results 
presenting a similar size effect (e.g. Banz, 1981; Reinganum, 1981). 
Value strategy, based on buying stocks with high book-to-market ratios (value stocks) and selling 
stocks with low book-to-market ratios (growth stocks), provides consistent abnormal returns 
according to Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985), confirming the earlier results from Stattman 
(1980). Similar results are reached by Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) and in addition, 
explanatory power is discovered from the earnings yield, cash flow yield and size factors. 
 
2.2.2 Anomaly or state variable? 
These results, of excess risk adjusted returns by different value based strategies, lead to adding two 
explanatory variables to the basic CAPM: the size factor (SMB) and the value factor (HML) (Fama 
and French, 1993)
13
. Since the size effect and the value effect cannot be explained by the CAPM 
they ought to include some information from an unknown risk factor relevant to asset pricing.  
The methodological switch  to add the unexplained anomalies as explanatory variables (state 
variables) rather as explained variables makes it possible to focus on studying the new anomalies 
discovered and at the same time, switching the focus somewhat away from these variables 
themselves. This thesis focuses on the behavior of the two of the core pillars in finance literature, 
since both value and momentum have been widely used when studying other market anomalies.   
There are countless amounts of empirical studies focusing on value effect and many of them offer 
new theoretical explanations for this effect. The role of the growth options is examined by Zhang 
(2005), who presents the quite controversial explanation that growth options might be less risky 
than the real investments and thus the value effect could be a result of rational expectations. This is 
strongly against the "general wisdom" that growth options should be the source of high betas 
                                                 
12
 The size effect stands for the stock market anomaly where small stocks (by market value of equity) outperform the 
large stocks (by the market value of equity) in risk adjusted returns. 
13
 Later, based on the findings from Carhart (1997), also the momentum factor (MOM) was added to the CAPM as 
explanatory variable. 
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because they are most valuable in good economic conditions (Grinblatt and Titman, 2001). This 
framework also eliminates the explanatory role of the irrational overreaction hypothesis offered by 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), where market anomalies, 
such as value or momentum, could be due to just a mere overreaction by the investors and the  
inability of arbitrage mechanisms to correct them. 
This framework, of value returns role as a result of unobserved rational risk from the different risks 
between fixed investments and growth options (Zhang, 2005), actually remove the anomaly state 
from the value effect and verifies its rationality as solid pricing (or state) factor. This explanation is 
rather important for this thesis, especially when analyzing the results, since it actually makes a 
remarkable difference between momentum effect and value effect. The reasoning is quite 
straightforward, if value returns are not an anomaly and should be present at the markets but the 
momentum returns are viewed as an anomaly, the increase of market efficiency (and liquidity) 
should diminish the momentum returns but actually strengthen the value returns. 
 
2.3Liquidity  
Liquidity is one of the corner stone’s in the classical perfect market assumption (Fama, 1970) and it 
has been intensely studied for decades. Yet there seems to be quite little consensus on what is the 
best way to measure it (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009) or even how does it exactly affect 
the markets. This section presents the previous studies on liquidity and builds the theoretical links 
between academic findings. 
 
2.3.1 Liquidity: the definitions 
"Liquidity is a quality of assets which... is not a very clear or easily measurable concept." -
Boulding (1955). 
There are many different dimensions to liquidity and multiple ways to define it. Demsetz (1968) 
describes liquidity, in his study of transaction costs in NYSE, as a cost of immediacy for investors 
wanting an immediate execution of their trade and therefore have to “pay” the bid-ask spread, or at 
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least half of it. On a more general level, Lippman and McCall (1986) present a way to define 
liquidity through the time needed to exchange an asset to money. The methods and details of these 
definitions can change but the main idea still always remains the same; liquidity enhances the 
ability to trade stocks quickly, with minimum price impact. Perfect liquidity would allow any 
amount of stocks to be traded immediately without any affect on the market price. Perfect illiquidity 
would on the other hand be the situation where you cannot trade any amount for any price. In 
modern financial theory, the real world trading is found somewhere between these two extremes. 
A review on market frictions by Stoll (2000) presents market frictions as a compensation for the 
supplier for immediacy, such as market makers. He divides this friction into two parts, real and 
informational friction, and finds both of these friction classes contributing to the total costs for 
demanders of immediacy.  
The real friction is the straightforward part of the total friction and it has been studied for decades 
(e.g. Garman, 1976; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; and Stoll, 2000).  It can be seen as a 
compensation for the real resource usage by the market makers, such as capital and labor, and a 
compensation for risk bearing and other inventory costs. The informational friction is the more 
complex part and is studied by behavioral finance (e.g. Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985; and Kyle, 1985). It arises from the information asymmetry between traders. Stoll 
(2000) presents informational friction as “the value of the information lost to more timely or better 
informed traders.” 
This division of market friction into two parts by Stoll (2000) can lead to the following market 
dynamics. Since it takes time to load off capital and labor costs (real friction) but the asymmetry of 
information (informational friction) is always present, there can be difference in the marginal affect 
that these two parts of friction have. These differences can lead to lagged adaptation by market 
makers to changing market conditions and then cause some lag to changes in market efficiencies 
when arbitrageurs are reacting to these changes. This dynamic is rather important for this thesis 
when reflecting the lagged connections in the Chapter 5.4. 
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2.3.2 Liquidity and the expected returns 
This section presents the strong evidence supporting the connection between liquidity and asset 
returns. Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1989) show that stocks with lower liquidity yield 
significantly higher returns when studying the connections between bid-ask spreads and market 
returns. These results are confirmed by Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) using the methods from 
Glosten and Harris (1988) and Hasbrouck (1991). 
The yield difference between U.S. treasury notes and bills is studied by Amihud and Mendelson 
(1991). They present that notes which are less liquid offer better yields than other notes with the 
same maturities. This clearly shows that investors are willing to pay premium for liquidity and is in 
line with the argument by Jacoby, Fowler and Gottesman (2000) that expected illiquidity (bid-ask 
spread) should affect investment decisions. 
The results by Amihud (2002) confirm earlier results that stock liquidity and expected liquidity 
explains the differences in expected returns. He shows that expected illiquidity has a positive effect 
on expected returns but unexpected changes in liquidity have a negative effect on the returns for 
corresponding period. These results are very intuitive, investors demand higher returns for less 
liquid investments and when liquidity changes unexpectedly, the value of these investments adjust 
to this new situation. 
A specific model to clarify this relation is offered by Acharya and Pedersen (2005). They present 
that, the correlation between aggregate market illiquidity to both stock specific returns and stock 
specific illiquidity should increase the stock specific required return and also that the relationship 
between stock specific illiquidity and market returns should decrease it. 
Incredibly interesting results are presented by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) who find that stock 
returns are cross-sectionally related to their sensitivity to changes in aggregate liquidity. They 
document an astonishing 7.5% annual excess return for stocks with high sensitivity to liquidity 
compared to the stocks with low sensitivity.
14
 They model the aggregate liquidity level with price 
reversals, following Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993) who build a model where risk-averse 
                                                 
14
 However, their time period (from 1966 to 1999) ends at the height of the dot-com bubble and one should use some 
caution when generalizing these results to different time periods. 
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market makers, defined in Grossman and Miller (1988), provide liquidity to the demanders of 
immediacy and are compensated with higher expected returns. 
 
2.3.3 Liquidity and market efficiency 
Interesting, robust and very relevant results come from Roll, Schwartz and Subrahmanyam (2007). 
They study the relationship between stock market liquidity and the index future basis. They find 
evidence that suggests that liquidity enhances the future cash pricing systems efficiency. In other 
words, the improvement in liquidity decreases profitable arbitrage situations. A very similar 
conclusion is made by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2008) in their study of return 
predictability from the daily order flow data. They find the predictability to diminish as liquidity 
improves. They conclude that these results are in line with the hypothesis of increasing arbitrage 
activity during liquid times and the enhancement of market efficiency. These results build the 
foundation for my hypothesis section by demonstrating the connection between market liquidity 
and arbitrage profits. 
A similar kind of connection between market efficiency and liquidity is found by Sadka and 
Scherbina (2007); they present a link between mispricing and liquidity by studying stocks with high 
analyst disagreement. Earlier research by Diether et al. (2002) shows that stocks with higher analyst 
disagreement on future earnings tend to underperform other stocks. This effect was documented to 
continue for 6 months. One possible explanation offered in the literature by Sadka and Scherbina 
(2007) is that, even as analysts tend to disagree more about bad news (Ciccone 2003), the full 
extent of these news are withhold from the markets (McNichols and O'Brien, 1997; and Hong, Lim 
and Stein, 2000). 
The results by Sadka and Scherbina (2007), showing that less liquid stocks tend to be more severely 
overpriced before the announcement dates, are in line with the theoretical models by Kyle (1985) 
and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) which predict that trading costs increase with information 
asymmetry. These trading costs can prevent trading by informed investors if they trade only when 
the profits exceed the trading costs. Then the price of the stock should lie in the no-arbitrage bounds 
around the fair value (Shleifer, 2000) and this would lead to the theoretical result that lower 
liquidity increases the mispricing. 
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These results are important guidelines when studying the connections between momentum and 
value investment returns, and market liquidity as they clearly imply that the increase (decrease) in 
market liquidity should increase (decrease) the arbitrage activity and therefore affect the returns 
from these investment strategies. 
 
2.3.4 Different forms of liquidity 
This section presents four different ways of looking at the stock market liquidity: stock specific 
liquidity, aggregate liquidity, liquidity changes and liquidity shocks. 
 
2.3.4.1 Stock specific liquidity 
Many earlier studies on stock market liquidity focus on stock specific liquidity (e.g. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998)) and are 
all able to find that less liquid shares have higher average returns. 
 
2.3.4.2 Aggregate liquidity 
Later on, focus started to move towards aggregate market liquidity. Amihud (2002) shows expected 
illiquidity to be priced variable and illiquidity in this sense provides premium in the stock returns. 
Methodology following Amihud (2002) has been widely used to proxy the aggregate market 
liquidity and found to provide robust results (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009). 
 
2.3.4.3 Liquidity changes 
Most of the earlier studies on liquidity e.g. Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996), Amihud (2002) focus on the levels of market liquidity and its changes, 
either aggregate or stock specific, and define it as a relevant factor for asset pricing.  
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The level of liquidity can been seen as the static component of trading costs that affect asset prices 
but the findings of commonality in liquidity by Chordia et al. (2000) raise the need for another 
dynamic way of defining liquidity, via liquidity shocks (i.e. innovations in liquidity). 
 
2.3.4.4 Liquidity shocks 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) present the fascinating results that sensitivity to innovations in 
aggregate liquidity seems to affect the stock returns. They build a model that proxies the aggregate 
liquidity through temporary price changes due the order flow and show that the correlation to 
innovations in market liquidity seems to significantly increase the stock returns.  
 
2.3.5 Autoregressive nature and commonality of liquidity 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) study aggregate market spreads, depths and trading 
activity for U.S. equities. They document that the average daily liquidity is highly volatile and 
negatively serially dependent. They find strong day-of-the-week effect where Tuesdays presented 
risen liquidity and Fridays significantly decreased liquidity. They also report a large increase in 
effective spreads in down markets and the, only marginal, recovery in up markets. This, down 
market variable, is the most significant variable in their analysis. This autoregressive nature of 
liquidity is also relevant to this study within the hypothesis building and as the results from 
expected and unexpected liquidity changes are found to differ. 
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Huberman and Halka (2001), and Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
(2000) find a commonality in the time-series movement of liquidity using relatively short samples 
ranging from two months to a year. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) find support to the 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) result of commonality in liquidity. However, they 
highlight that these results are from 1988 to 1998, at a time of a strong bull markets, and the results 
can differ in other environments. Similar results of predictable patterns in liquidity is documented 
by Admati and Pfleiderer (1989) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990). 
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A fascinating aspect of "liquidity anomaly", i.e. the autoregressive cyclical nature of liquidity, is 
pointed out by, among others, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). 
They argue that the liquidity anomaly is in matter of fact self-perpetuating, as if investors realize the 
lower liquidity, they should rationally avoid trading during those times, which would even further 
reduce liquidity. This framework is also used within the hypothesis building to separate liquidity 
changes from liquidity shocks, and to argue why their affect on momentum and value returns 
should differ. 
 
2.3.6 Liquidity and momentum 
One of the papers closely related to this thesis is Lee and Swaminathan (2000) who study the link 
between price momentum and trading volume. They find that past trading volumes predict both the 
magnitude and the persistence of momentum returns, and even more interestingly that most of the 
excess returns in volume-based investment strategies rise due to the changes in trading volumes, 
rather than its static levels. They report that "Firms whose recent volume is higher (lower) than 
volume four years ago experience significantly lower (higher) future returns." (ibid.) These results 
highlight the relevance of studying both market liquidity and its changes, when connecting it to the 
returns from momentum and value investing.  
More light is shed to the link between the changes in liquidity and momentum returns also by 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). They show that the stock returns’ sensitivity to the innovations in the 
aggregate liquidity affect the stocks’ expected returns in a way that stocks that are more sensitive to 
these changes have higher expected returns. They also report that liquidity risk factor accounts for 
half of the momentum excess profits as adding the liquidity innovation factor to their regression 
reduces the momentum portfolios alpha by nearly fifty percent. These results raise the clear need 
for adding the unexpected liquidity shocks to this study. 
A parallel research for my study Avramov et al. (2013) focuses on the connections between market 
illiquidity and momentum payoffs. The illiquid market periods are followed by negative shocks in 
momentum returns and the disappearance of positive momentum returns in the recent times 
becomes significant again following the low market illiquidity (ibid.). These findings clarify the 
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role that market liquidity plays when explaining changes in the momentum investing returns and are 
in line with the results presented in this study. 
 
2.4 Other relative literature 
This section briefly summarizes two relative fields to this study: price reversals and the transaction 
costs. The first one is strongly linked to the daily stock market movements and thus relative to this 
study and the latter is very strongly connected to the market frictions and hence, liquidity. 
 
2.4.1 Price reversals 
“The results documented here reliably reject the hypothesis that the stock prices follow random 
walks.” – Jegadeesh (1990). 
This chapter presents a major ingredient when studying daily stock returns: the price reversal effect. 
Even though the price reversal effect is not the core focus of this study it is mandatory to take them 
into account when studying the reliability of the results.  
Early academic findings by Dann, Mayers and Raab (1977) give an indication towards the later 
findings of price reversals as they show that stock prices tend to decrease after a trade with a large 
block of stocks. This block trade illiquidity effect is however balanced in a matter of minutes i.e. 
they actually find an intra-day price reversal.  
Later, really groundbreaking findings by Lehmann (1990) and Jegadeesh (1990) show that a 
contrarian strategy based on last week’s or month’s performance generated significant abnormal 
returns of approximately 1.7% per week and 2.5% per month, respectively. This is a clear violation 
of even a weak form of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) and the magnitude of these 
abnormal returns is astonishing. These results are amplified by Bremer and Sweeney (1991) who 
show that large negative results are followed by abnormally positive earnings in the next two days. 
They used -10% negative daily return as a trigger value and documented a 2.2% average cumulative 
rebound.  This is also a confirmation for the earlier results from Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988) 
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who show that negative price shocks were followed by abnormally positive returns for up to 60 
days using -2,5% returns as the trigger. 
Bremer and Sweeney (1991) mention in a side comment that one of the possible reasons for this 
effect is illiquidity. Support for this argument is establish by Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) who find 
a relation between short-term price reversal profits and bid-ask spreads. These results imply that the 
returns from this strategy could be due to the illiquidity on the markets. This strong correlation 
between short term price reversals and liquidity (bid-ask spread in this case) have allowed the price 
reversal to be also used as an effective proxy for liquidity. 
Interesting detail is shown by Cox and Peterson (1994) who study the price reversal effect and 
confirm the earlier findings of mean reversal, but it reduces over time and vanishes after October 
1987. Smaller firms also reverse more than the large ones. They present that the short-term price 
reversal can be explained by the bid-ask bounce and the degree of market liquidity. They find no 
evidence to support the market overreaction hypotheses. They also report statistically significant 
"anti" mean reversal for the longer maturity (4-20 days). The diminishing of the reversal profits in 
October 1987 is the most interesting detail, since it happens at the same time as the Black Monday 
crash. This is an important detail related to this study since the thesis focuses on the post 2008 
financial crisis time period. 
A vast amount of other theoretical explanations has been offered for price reversals. Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990) show that a large part of these returns could be due to the delayed stock price 
reactions. The pioneering studies in this field by Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985), Jegadeesh 
(1990) and Lehmann (1990) argue that short-term reversal profits are caused by the trading costs 
which hurt the arbitrage mechanism. This kind of reasoning is also supported by the studies on 
price reversals and bid-ask spread where the price reversals are found mostly to fall within the bid-
ask bounds (Kaul and Nimalendran, 1990; Ball, Kothari and Wasley, 1995; and Conrad, Gultekin 
and Kaul, 1997). 
Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) find a strong relationship between short-run reversals and 
stock liquidity. However, they state that the profits from contrarian trading seem to be smaller than 
the expected trading costs. They show a link between liquidity and reversal profits using the 
Amihud (2002) measure of liquidity. The results support the rational equilibrium framework 
(Campbell, Grossman and Wang, 1993) and show that there are much stronger reversals with less 
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liquid stocks. Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) use the transaction cost estimates by Keim and 
Madhavan (1997) and market impact cost analysis by Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) and conclude 
that there doesn't seem to be profits for outside investors, i.e. non-market-maker investors, due to 
the high transaction costs. These are also quite relevant results as this study focuses on investing 
strategies that require a lot less trading and are since less affected by the role of the transaction 
costs. 
Another important finding from the price reversal field comes from Groot, Huij and Zhou (2012). 
Their findings are relevant in two different ways: first to highlight the tenacious nature of these 
returns even during the most liquid times and second the clear imperfections in transaction cost 
estimation traditions. The researchers show that the trading costs in short-term trading are mainly 
due to trading with small cap stocks. They find that reversal strategies generated 30 (when focusing 
on largest U.S stocks) to 50 (when using an algorithm to improve results) basis points per week net 
profit after trading costs. They also find a weekly return of 20 basis points in European stock 
markets when focusing on the largest stocks and using a smarter trading algorithm. The study uses 
both Keim and Madhavan (1997) model and estimates provided by Nomura to estimate the 
transaction costs. The first model seems to be unfit to estimate the most recent transaction costs as it 
predicted even positive costs. (Groot, Huij and Zhou, 2012) 
Groot, Huij and Zhou (2012) argue that as the reversal profits are significant among the large cap 
stocks during the most recent decades when the market liquidity has been greatly increased, they 
explain that these profits are due to the imbalances by market makers and a compensation for 
inventory risks (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995). This argumentation is also relevant to this study, 
since similar perspective to the arbitrage strategy return development is hypothesized in the 
hypothesis section. 
 
2.4.2 Transaction costs 
This section looks into an important factor in the profitability of momentum and value investing, 
the transaction costs. The importance of transaction cost rises from the active portfolio re-allocation 
needed for these investing strategies and the findings which many researchers have reached, that  
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momentum returns diminish after taking into account the transaction costs (e.g. Lesmond, Schill 
and Zhou, 2004; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004). 
The relation between transaction costs and excess market returns is studied by Stoll and Whaley 
(1983) and Schultz (1983). Both of these studies study the robustness of the excess returns from 
holding small companies. Stoll and Whaley (1983), motivated by the findings of excess returns 
before transaction costs earned from investing in small firms presented by Banz (1981) and 
Reinganum (1981), find no statistically significant excess post-transaction cost returns from buying 
small companies. These tests were duplicated by Schultz (1983) who studied even smaller stocks 
with higher transaction costs presenting the groundbreaking and robust results, that the excess 
returns by small firms can’t be explained merely by transaction cost differences.  
The following three papers presented build the theoretical foundation on transaction costs in the 
form of price impacts: Kyle (1985), Glosten and Harris (1988) and Breen, Hodrick and Korajczyk 
(2002), to mention just a few. 
First Kyle (1985) builds a theoretical model where three kinds of traders are present: insider 
investor with inside information, noise traders and market makers, and they make their investment 
decisions in a dynamic trading environment. This paper shows that in this setting the discrete 
trading with asymmetry of information, the frequent trading can lead to constant volatility and 
efficient price setting in the semi-strong sense. (Kyle, 1985) 
The bid-ask spread is studied by Glosten and Harris (1988). In this theoretical paper they present a 
theoretical view using elasticity of supply and demand to illustrate the possibility of economic rents 
in bid-ask spreads. They find evidence to support this view in the empirical analysis of the 
FTSE100. (Glosten and Harris, 1988) 
And finally the relation between transaction costs and trading volumes is studied by Breen, Hodrick 
and Korajczyk (2002). They build a theoretical model of price impact that study the ease of trading 
shares without price impact. They first rank all of the trades as either buyer or seller initiated and 
then calculate the net turnover in the observed time period by calculating the buyer initiated trading 
volume minus seller initiated trading volume and then scaling this to the shares outstanding. This 
net turnover is used to proxy the price impact linking it to the price changes during that period. 
(Breen, Hodrick and Korajczyk, 2002) 
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Another, quite popular, method for estimating transaction costs is presented by Keim and 
Madhavan (1997). This method is used for example by Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) to 
demonstrate that there are no significant net profits from short term reversals in investment 
strategies. However, Groot, Huij and Zhou (2012), a paper presented in the previous chapter, show 
that the Keim and Madhavan (1997) method should be used with caution. They found it to provide 
downward biased estimates and even to become negative in some cases, a clear misevaluation from 
the model (Groot, Huij and Zhou, 2012). 
Another interesting, and a very robust, way to evaluate transaction costs and momentum comes 
from Korajczyk and Sadka (2004). They study the maximum size of a fund that perform momentum 
strategy and still remains profitable. They show that the excess returns of some momentum 
strategies disappear only after $4.5 billion to over $5.0 billion is allocated to these strategies. This 
investment is the marginal investment and doesn’t include the currently active traders (ibid.) and 
also reports of a weakening of the profitability of momentum strategies after transaction costs. 
These profits do not completely vanish but diminish severely. 
Finally, the recent findings by Frazzini, Israel and Moskowitz (2012) raise a serious doubt on the 
magnitude of the transaction costs obtained from the previous studies. They use live trading data 
from large institutional money managers amounting to nearly one trillion dollars in trading volume 
and conclude that the real transaction costs are “less than a tenth” compared to previous results in 
literature. 
As a concluding remark about transaction costs, there seem to be no robust reasons for using 
estimates by Keim and Madhavan (1997) which have been shown to provide speculative results in 
recent times (Groot, Huij and Zhou, 2012) or any other method that would overestimate the real 
transaction costs by large institutional investors with a huge margin (Frazzini, Israel and 
Moskowitz, 2012) since after all, momentum and value investments are very much usable by many 
of these large institutions. 
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3 Hypothesis 
“a liquidity risk factor accounts for half of the profits to a momentum strategy…” – Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003). 
This section presents the two main hypotheses of this thesis. Both of these hypotheses aim to study 
momentum and value investment returns and their connections to fluctuations in market liquidity 
from different perspectives. The first one focuses on market liquidity and the second one to the 
shocks in market liquidity. 
 
H1: Market liquidity affects momentum and value investment returns. 
The first hypothesis is built around the argumentation that liquidity increases market efficiency and 
should therefore lower arbitrage profits and other opportunities for obtaining positive alpha 
investments. Thus it can be implied that in times of low liquidity (high liquidity), momentum and 
value investment returns should be the largest (lowest), due to more inefficient (efficient) market 
conditions. The following academic results support this view and clearly indicate that liquidity 
affect the market returns, ex-post and ex-ante.  
First studying the vast amount of evidence showing that liquidity affect asset prices (e.g. Amihud 
and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, 2002) and add these findings to the persistence in liquidity, found 
by e. g. Amihud (2002) presenting that  higher liquidity in time t predicts higher liquidity in time 
t+1. This implies that liquidity predicts future returns (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). When adding 
these factors to the theoretical framework offered by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), where market 
efficiency is provided by special arbitrageurs investing capital of outside investor monitoring the 
arbitrageur’ performance, these effects can be studied from the perspective where market liquidity 
diminishes the excess profits from strategies such as momentum and value investments. This view 
is also supported by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2008) who find the predictability in stock 
markets diminishing as liquidity improves and conclude that this increasing arbitrage activity 
during liquid times enchases market efficiency. 
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This first hypothesis is tested by studying the relationship between the average daily market 
liquidity and momentum and value investment returns, as the null hypothesis tested here is that 
there are no correlations between momentum and value returns, and market liquidity.  
 
H2: Unexpected shocks in market liquidity, rather than simple proportional changes, affect 
momentum and value returns. 
The second hypothesis is also based on the findings by Amihud (2002) confirming that expected 
illiquidity has a positive effect on expected returns but unexpected changes in liquidity have a 
negative effect on a corresponding period’s returns and the framework by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) where when an unexpected shock occurs in market liquidity, not only does it affect the 
profits by these investment strategies per se, but also to affect the restrictions for the special 
arbitrageurs in the markets. 
When market liquidity suddenly dries up, there are two simultaneous effects. First, investments 
suffer losses and the arbitrageurs are forced to lower their holdings in their positions due to the 
outside investor pressure (margin calls, to mention one, can be seen as such pressure) and this 
causes some price pressure for the very same investments that they are holding; and second, as 
market liquidity lowers, they are not able to enter profitably to the same positions (net after the 
trading costs) as before. Both of these factors can be seen to hurt the returns for these arbitrageurs 
and affect the prices of the assets they are investing in. 
This special role of unexpected shocks can also be studied from the theoretical, self fulfilling 
prophecy type of a perspective offered by e.g. Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) and Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988). They argue that the "liquidity anomaly" (the cyclical nature of liquidity) is in 
matter of fact a self-perpetuating, as if investors find out about the lower liquidity, they should 
rationally avoid trading during those times, which would even further reduce the liquidity. In this 
setting, the unexpected liquidity shocks should have a unique position when comparing to the 
simple level of market liquidity or its basic changes as they present the unexpected change. 
This hypothesis is tested using the same AR(2) model to proxy liquidity shocks (LS) following 
Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) and comparing these results to the purely proportional 
market liquidity change factor (LC). 
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4 Data and Methods 
This chapter presents the data and methodology used in this thesis. First, the data used in this study 
is presented and analyzed. Second, different momentum and value measures are established and the 
choices made are discussed and linked to the previous literature. Third, the different ways to proxy 
liquidity are presented and the motivational selection of the main methods is reflected based on the 
previous literature. 
 
4.1 Data 
There are two different data sets used for this study. First, stock market data gathered from the 
CRSP database and second, the Fama-French three-factors from the Kenneth French webpage
15
. All 
data used in this study is daily stock market data. First I introduce the stock market data from the 
CRSP database and all the factors calculated from this dataset and the details of Fama-French three-
factors are then later introduced in the Section 4.4. 
The stock market data from CRSP database consists of all of the NYSE listed ordinary shares
16
 
from 2009 to 2012
17
. The filtering of the dataset follows Amihud (2002) with minor changes
18
. All 
the shares must fulfill the following criteria in order to be qualified to this dataset: 
1. The share must be listed in the NYSE at the end of the previous year. 
                                                 
15
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html. 
16
 Selected by using NYSE code (1) as a conditional statement for exchange code. 
17
 Stocks must have been listed in the NYSE at the end of the previous year in order to qualify for the data set. i.e. 
31.12.2008, 31.12.2009, 31.12.2010 and 30.12.2011 for the year’s 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively, are used as 
threshold listing days. 
18
 First, a 1$ threshold for the stock price is used as my dataset doesn't consist pre-decimalization unlike Amihud (2002) 
and since the higher 5$ threshold seems unnecessarily limiting for the time period studied here. Second, no market 
capitalization filtering is necessary since they are eliminated already during the data selection phase. Third, I used only 
the trading data availability as an eliminatory factor as a day of no price change (included with Amihud (2002) as 
eliminatory factor also) but still trading volume would stand as a day of perfect liquidity in my view and such shares 
should definitely be involved when studying liquidity.  
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2. The share must have at least 200 days of trading volume data available during the previous year. 
3. Shares with share prices lower than $ 1 at the end of the previous year are eliminated. 
4. 1% outliers are eliminated from the liquidity measure data. 
Four different data measures from CRSP database are used in this study: share price (P), trading 
volume (V), daily return (R) and number of shares outstanding (S). 
The following table (Table 1) provides the basic statistical information from the data set used for 
momentum and liquidity factor calculations: 
 
 
 
This is the raw data for the four factors, share price (P), trading volume (V), daily return (R) and 
number of shares outstanding (S) introduced earlier. The following two sections (Section 4.2 and 
Section 4.2) present the methodology on how these factors are transferred to the momentum and 
liquidity factors used in this study.  
 
Portfolio 2009 2010 2011 2012
No. of shares, original sample 2433 2404 2443 2466
No. of shares, beginning of the year 1770 1770 1751 1841
No. of shares, end of the year 1770 1700 1670 1776
Table 1
Number of shares in the data set
This table presents the number of shares qualified for the data set. No. of shares, original
sample , presents the number of individual shares in the raw data set before the filtering. The
No. of shares, beginning of the year  presents the number of shares qualified for the final data 
set at the beginning of that particular year and the No. of shares, end of the year presents the
number of shares in the final data set at the end of that particular year.
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4.2 Momentum and value measures 
This section presents the three portfolio classes studied: First, the cross sectional momentum factor 
(M), second the value factor (V) and the combined 50/50 value-momentum portfolio (MV). These 
portfolios proxy the arbitrage profits from momentum and value investing strategies in this study. 
 
4.2.1 Cross sectional momentum 
This section presents the four momentum portfolios, the details on how they are built. 
Momentum portfolios are formed using the past 12 months (252 trading dates) returns to build up 
equally weighted portfolios following the traditional methodology in momentum literature 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993;
19
 Sadka, 2006; Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen, 2013). The 
portfolios are formed for three months (63 trading dates) and rebalanced after each three months (63 
trading dates) period in order to avoid possible problems with overlapping data. Following the 
previous literature, a lag of one month  (21 trading dates) is used for main momentum portfolios to 
mitigate the problems with price reversals, bid-ask bounces and other short term imperfections,  and 
also to give conservative results that mimic the time needed for arbitragers to enter their positions in 
stock markets. The one month lag is important for the robustness of the results and improves the 
momentum returns
20
 (Bhootra, 2011). In addition, two portfolios of no lag periods are studied to 
reveal the affect that immediate portfolio allocation would have on the momentum returns.  
There are two different momentum portfolio strategies applied in this study. First, a one-third 
portfolio where top (bottom) third performing stocks are bought (sold) and second a 10% portfolio 
where top (bottom) 10% of these NYSE listed shares are bought (sold) for the portfolio in similar 
way. The first portfolio formation method is motivated by Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) 
to add simplicity and robustness to the results. The second method is used to obtain the results from 
                                                 
19
 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) used look back periods of 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters and also holding periods of 1, 2, 3 and 
4 quarters. 
20
 This result is also confirmed here as the one-month-lack portfolios outperform the portfolios without such lag period. 
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the shares most heavily affected by the momentum phenomenon i.e. the most radically performed 
stocks in the past 12 months (252 trading dates). 
There are, in total, four momentum portfolios used:        portfolio with 10% investments with no 
lag between look back and investment period,         portfolio with similar 10% investment but 
with 21 day lag period before investing,        portfolio with one-third investments with no lag 
between look back and investment period and finally         portfolio with one-third investments 
with 21 day lag period before investing. 
 
4.2.2 Value portfolio 
The value portfolio is formed with the HML values obtained from the Kenneth French database
21
 
and it defines the daily returns from value investing as: 
        
Where    is the return from value investing in a day t and      is the daily HML value obtained 
from the Kenneth French database. 
   
4.2.3 Value and Momentum portfolio 
A combination portfolio is built using daily value and momentum returns following Asness, 
Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) as the average return from these individual strategies. 
                 
Where   is the daily momentum return as defined in the Section 4.3.1 and     presents the return 
from the combined value and momentum portfolio. 
 
                                                 
21
 See Section "4.5 Other data" for detailed information. 
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4.2.4 Statistical characteristics of investment portfolios 
This section presents the basic statistical details for the momentum (M), value (V) and combination 
portfolios (MV). 
The following table (Table 2) presents the correlations between the nine investment portfolios 
studied. 
 
Table 2 clearly demonstrates two important factors. First, the correlations between momentum 
portfolios (and combination portfolios) are very strong ranging from 0.87 to 0.97 (from 0.89 to 
0.97). And second, that the correlation between value returns and momentum returns are very low 
0.09. This statistical detail is an important starting point since it clearly highlights the difference 
between these two investment strategies. 
The following table, Table 3, presents basic statistical characteristics of the nine portfolios studied. 
 
V M10%, 0 M10%, 21 M1/3, 0 M1/3, 21 MV10%, 0 MV10%, 21 MV1/3, 0 MV1/3, 21
V 1
M10%, 0 0.089 1
M10%, 21 0.124 0.921 1
M1/3, 0 0.111 0.966 0.873 1
M1/3, 21 0.140 0.908 0.972 0.911 1
MV10%, 0 0.352 0.964 0.898 0.938 0.891 1
MV10%, 21 0.379 0.882 0.965 0.843 0.943 0.931 1
MV1/3, 0 0.416 0.912 0.837 0.950 0.878 0.969 0.891 1
MV1/3, 21 0.439 0.852 0.920 0.862 0.951 0.918 0.974 0.926 1
Table 2
Cross sectional correlations between investment portfolios.
This table presents the cross sectional correlation between the momentum (M), value (V) and combination portfolios (MV). These
measures are calculated from the 733 day period used as active study period and not including the look back period (year 2009 and first 21
days of 2010).
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The Table 3 provides one rather importand detail. Even as the correlations between all of the 
momentum portfolios is very strong (between 0.87 and 0.97), the average returns and cumulative 
returns differ greatly. The difference between the cumulative returns from the best performing 
portfolio (       ) and the worst performing portfolio (      ) was an astonishing 55.17% points. 
The four combination portfolios (      ,         ,         and         ) share the similar 
common features as the four momentum portfolios (      ,        ,        and        ). They all 
have positive average daily returns from the studied time period and strong correlation between 
each other (ranging from 0.89 to 0.97), yet there are quite remarkable differences in the cumulative 
returns (lowest return -1.43% and highest 23.68%). Also all the skewness factors are positive and 
kurtosis factors positive and relatively large. This would imply peaked return distributions with 
longer tails, especially to the right side of the distribution. 
The differences between momentum and value investment returns are also clearly visible from the 
Table 3. The average (and cumulative) returns from value factor is negative, kurtosis is much lower, 
skewness is negative and it have much lower variance. All and all, the value factor seems to be 
much less volatile and evenly distributed than the momentum factors. 
 
4.3 Liquidity measures 
This section introduces the six different liquidity measures used in this thesis. Instead of using the 
same liquidity measures as in Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013), two widely used market 
M10%, 0 M10%, 21 M1/3, 0 M1/3, 21 MV10%, 0 MV10%, 21 MV1/3, 0 MV1/3, 21 V
Average 0.045 0.070 0.004 0.016 0.022 0.033 0.001 0.006 -0.004
Variance 2.413 2.512 1.656 1.702 0.694 0.722 0.505 0.517 0.200
Kurtosis 15.024 15.782 18.565 18.753 12.594 12.885 14.082 13.977 0.764
Skewness 1.428 1.624 1.522 1.726 1.082 1.250 1.039 1.230 -0.102
Min -7.636 -7.304 -7.092 -6.813 -4.238 -4.072 -3.966 -3.826 -1.640
Max 15.237 15.001 13.175 12.956 7.718 7.600 6.687 6.578 1.690
Cumulative returns 27.94 % 52.06 % -3.11 % 5.40 % 14.59 % 23.68 % -1.43 % 2.24 % -3.87 %
Nr of obs. 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733
Statistical characteristics of momentum (M), value (V) and combination portfolios (MV).
This table presents the basic statistical measures for returns of the nine investment portfolios studied. These measures are calculated from the 733
day period used as active study period and not including the look back period (year 2009 and 21 days of 2010).
Table 3
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liquidity proxies are used (trading volume and turnover) and aim to compliment the results by 
Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013). 
 
4.3.1 Trading Volume 
"...our results show that the effect of trading volume on price momentum is more complex than 
prior research suggests." - Lee and Swaminathan (2000). 
The first market liquidity measure used is the trading volume. It has been widely used in the 
academic literature and for example, Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001) present a 
strong negative correlation between innovations in trading volume and equity returns. 
The trading volume measure used is the natural logarithm of the dollar volume of trading following 
Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001): 
                       (1) 
Where        is the daily trading volume of share s in day t,      is the price of the share s in a day t 
and      is the trading volume of the share s in a day t. 
The average market trading volume is formed by the following calculation: 
          
 
 
         
 
          (2) 
Where     is the liquidity proxy obtained from the trading volume and N is the number of shares in 
the portfolio as defined in the Data section 4.1. 
 
4.3.2 Turnover 
The second liquidity measure used is the turnover (e.g. Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman, 
2001; Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt, 2007). It is based on the same underlying assumption as the 
trading volume; the most actively traded stocks are also the most liquid ones, but in this method the 
size effect is controlled by using the following formula: 
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         (3) 
Where       is the turnover of share s in a time t and      is the shares outstanding for the share s in 
a time t and the      is the trading volume of the share s in a day t. 
The average turnover ratio is: 
     
 
 
  
    
    
           (4) 
Where     is the liquidity proxy obtained from the turnover and the N is the number of shares in 
the portfolio as defined in the Data section 4.1. 
 
4.3.3 Market liquidity 
Now that the liquidity measures have been defined, the three different methods on how to use them 
are presented next. The first method is used to explain the connection between stock market 
momentum and value returns and the level of market liquidity uses the pure market liquidity as the 
explanatory variable: 
             (5) 
Where     is the market liquidity in a time t. 
All of the market liquidity measures are calculated as equal-weighted averages of the daily liquidity 
estimates for stocks in NYSE. Using equal-weighted liquidity portfolios instead of the value-
weighted follows the studies by Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005). These market liquidity measures are the two measures,     and     presented 
earlier in this chapter, in the last two sections. 
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4.3.4 Proportional changes in market liquidity 
The method for changes in market liquidity follows the proportional liquidity change factor used in 
Chordia et al. (2000) and the factor for this liquidity change LC is defined as follows: 
     
          
     
       (6) 
Where     is the market liquidity factor at time t (ex post) and       is the market liquidity at time t-1 
(ex ante). 
 
4.3.5 Shocks in aggregate liquidity 
The third liquidity estimator category differs significantly from the previous two and presents the 
theoretically soundest estimator. As the changes in liquidity is studied by using the AR(2) model, 
the focus is on the unexpected shock rather than just the anticipated changes in liquidity. 
Liquidity shocks are defined as the residuals from the AR(2) model following Asness, Moskowitz 
and Pedersen (2013). These estimates are obtained from the following regression model: 
                          (7) 
Where   ,      and      are the liquidity measures in the time t, t-1 and t-2 respectively and the 
residual   represents the liquidity shocks. The liquidity shock measure   is used as the liquidity 
shock proxy to connect the changes in aggregate liquidity changes to the momentum returns and the 
following measure for innovations in liquidity is defined: 
              (8) 
Where     is the measure for shocks in aggregate liquidity and   stands for the residuals from the 
AR(2) regression (Regression 7) and stands as the estimator for market liquidity shocks in this 
study. 
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4.3.6 Statistical characteristics of liquidity factors 
This section presents and analysis the basic statistical characteristics for the liquidity factors and the 
correlations between them. 
The Table 4 presents correlations between the six liquidity factors. 
 
Table 4 presents two major factors. First, the correlation between daily liquidity measures     and 
    are much stronger with the liquidity shock measures      and      (ranging from 0.67 to 
0.78) than with the measures of the simple proportional liquidity changes      and      (ranging 
from 0.36 to 0.46) and second, that the correlation between the liquidity shock measures      and 
     and the measures of the proportional liquidity changes      and      are very strong 
(ranging from 0.79 to 0.88). The latter correlation is rather significant, as the strong correlation 
between the unexpected liquidity changes (LS) and the proportional liquidity changes (LC) reach 
such a high level, yet their relationships with the momentum and value returns differs significantly, 
as we will see later. 
The following Table 5 presents basic statistical characteristics for the six liquidity factors. 
LTV LTO LCTV LCTO LSTV LSTO
LTV 1
LTO 0.887 1
LCTV 0.435 0.364 1
LCTO 0.361 0.366 0.934 1
LSTV 0.775 0.669 0.878 0.788 1
LSTO 0.689 0.740 0.786 0.790 0.900 1
Table 4
Cross correlations between the liquidity factors
This table presents the cross correlations between all of the six liquidity factors presented earlier in this
chapter.
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Table 5 presents two interesting details. First, the trading volume (   ) seems to be much more 
stable than the turnover (     as its proportional changes are much lower. Second, the high kurtosis 
and negative skewness indicate the presence of negative shocks for the three trading volume 
measure (         and     ) and the high kurtosis and positive skewness indicate positive shocks 
for the three turnover measure (         and      . These differences are interesting since the 
overall correlations between these liquidity proxies are very high in all of the three categories (L, 
LC and LS) as we saw from the Table 4. 
 
4.4 Other data 
This section presents the details on the two Fama-French factors used as control variables and the 
risk-free return used in calculating the excess returns. This is daily data downloaded from the 
Kenneth French web pages
22
 and includes three factors:     ,     and   , standing for market 
excess returns, small minus big factor and risk-free returns, respectively. 
                                                 
22
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html 
LTV LTO LCTV LCTO LSTV LSTO
Average 17.637 0.008 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000
Standard Deviation 0.211 0.002 0.011 0.201 0.163 0.001
Min 16.500 0.003 -0.086 -0.790 -1.334 -0.008
Max 18.501 0.021 0.056 1.645 0.473 0.009
Skewness -0.552 1.952 -0.426 2.155 -1.227 0.863
Kurtosis 5.144 8.643 9.910 14.177 9.546 6.159
Nr of obs. 733 733 733 733 733 733
Table 5
Summary of statistical characteristics of the liquidity factors.
This table presents the basic statistical measures for the six liquidity factors used in this study: LTV, 
LTO, LCTV, LCTO, LSTV and LSTO. These measures are calculated from the 733 day period used
as active study period and not including the look back period (year 2009 and first 21 days of 2010).
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The daily values are used for three years 2010-2012 and there are 733 observations for each of these 
three factors. The following Table 6 presents the main statistical measures from the two main 
factors
23
      and    . 
 
The Table 6 highlights two important details from the studied time period. First, the average market 
return      is positive for this period
24
 and second the negative skewness and positive (and very 
high) level of kurtosis indicating a "fat tail" for the negative market returns. 
The correlation between Fama-French three-factors (including the value factor introduced earlier) 
also provides some interesting details. Especially the strong correlation between the      and     
(0.53) and between      and     (0.34). The correlation between     and     are on the other 
hand found out be very low (0.06). 
 
                                                 
23
 The role of the third one,    (the risk free return) is more or less irrelevant during the studied time period as the 
historically low interest rates caused it to take only two values: 0.001% (209 times) and 0% (545 times). 
24
 And more importantly the cumulative returns amounting to 37.25% from 2010 to 2012. 
Rm-f SMB
Average 0.051 0.012
Standard deviation 1.211 0.554
Min -6.960 -2.010
Max 4.980 3.560
Skewness -0.347 0.233
Kurtosis 3.611 2.480
Nr of obs. 733 733
Table 6
Summary of Fama-French Factor Characteristics
This table presents the statistical details from the two
Fama-French factors used as control variables. These
measures are calculated from the 733 day period used
as active study period and not including the look back 
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4.5 Regressions 
This chapter presents the regressions used and links these methods in the previous literature and 
theory. First regressions (Regressions: 9, 10 and 11) are used to see whether there are any abnormal 
returns for momentum and value investment strategies. Second part of the regressions (Regressions 
12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17) adds the liquidity to these regressions and evaluates the role that market 
liquidity plays with momentum and value phenomena. The third part of the regressions 
(Regressions 18, 19 and 20) focuses on the slow moving affect of liquidity and the last regressions 
(Regressions 21, 22 and 23) present the dummy variable approach used for segmenting the liquidity 
shocks. 
First regression model is used to evaluate the performance of the momentum portfolio and its 
ability to provide abnormal returns. The following modification from the Fama-French three model 
is used for this purpose
25
. 
                                  (9) 
Where   is the excess return (over the risk-free return     ) of momentum portfolio at day t,    is 
the alpha of the momentum portfolio   .    and      present the relation between the momentum 
portfolio   to the two control measures        and     . 
Then the similar regressions are performed for the value portfolio    and the 50/50 combination 
portfolio    using the same two Fama-French factors        and      as control variables. This 
methodology is motivated by Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) where they found clear 
connections between liquidity risk and returns from both momentum and value investment 
strategies. 
                                   (10) 
                                     (11) 
                                                 
25
 The HML is not used as a control variable in this thesis since it is used as an explained variable. 
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Where    stands for the daily return from the value investment strategy and     as the daily return 
from the combined momentum and value strategy. 
Then, additional liquidity factors are introduced to study liquidity’s affect on momentum, value and 
combination portfolio returns. The following six regressions focus on this particular issue. 
                       (12) 
                        (13) 
                         (14) 
                                        (15) 
                                          (16) 
                                           (17) 
Where     is the liquidity factor (L, LC and LS) of the market at a time period t, as introduced earlier 
in this chapter and the     presents the relation between the used liquidity factor      and the returns 
in the momentum, value and combination investment strategies studied. The first three regressions 
(Regressions 12, 13 and 14) focus on the uncontrolled explanatory power of the liquidity (L), 
liquidity changes (LC) and liquidity shocks (LS) have and the second part of the regressions 
(Regression 15, 16 and 17) focus on the controlled explanatory power. 
The following six regressions are similar to the Regressions 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 in all other 
aspects except the liquidity factor used. For the following regressions the liquidity factor is the past 
liquidity       . 
                         (18) 
                          (19) 
                           (20) 
                                          (21) 
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                                            (22) 
                                             (23) 
Where        presents the lagged liquidity factor where x presents the number of trading date lags 
used (range from 1 to 5). 
The last part uses dummy variable approach to divide the liquidity shock measures (LS) into six 
parts based on the sign and magnitude of the liquidity shock and runs the following regressions: 
                                      (24) 
                                        (25) 
                                         (26) 
The    factor presents the liquidity shock dummies used. There are six different dummies which are 
introduced in more detail in the dummy variable section (Section 5.5). 
 
5 The results 
This chapter presents the results and analyses them using the theoretical framework and 
methodology build in the previous chapters. 
First, the Section 5.1 presents the findings of no positive alphas for both momentum and value 
investment strategies. Second, the Section 5.2 adds the liquidity measures and demonstrates minor 
explanatory power it poses over momentum and value returns. Third, the Section 5.3 introduces a 
one day lagged liquidity measures and finds significant correlations between liquidity measure and 
momentum returns. Fourth, the Section 5.4 studies the time structure of these correlations and 
presents the clearly slowly moving affect that market liquidity and unexpected liquidity shocks 
have on both momentum and value investment returns. And finally, the Section 5.5 divides the 
different unexpected liquidity shocks into six categories and reveals that the affect is mainly driven 
by the positive liquidity shocks, rather than the negative ones. 
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5.1 First results: no positive alphas 
This section studies the overall performance of momentum and value investment strategies. 
Regressions 9, 10 and 11 study whether there seems to be positive alphas for these investment 
strategies. 
The following Table 7 presents these results and shows the regression coefficients between the 
investment strategies and the two Fama-French factors (     and SMB) used as control variables: 
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None of the four momentum portfolios studied here are able to provide statistically significant 
positive alphas i.e. the excess momentum profits seem to have disappeared during the studied post 
financial crisis period. These results are in line with the results by Daniel and Moskowitz (2012) 
showing the crash in momentum profits after market declines. The very same results are obtained 
when studying the returns from value and the combination investment strategies. The absence of 
positive alphas in all of these portfolios confirms the results by Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Tong 
(2013) as the excess profits for arbitrage strategies such as momentum and value diminished as 
market liquidity improved in recent times. 
Portfolio Alpha Rm-f SMB
M10%, 0 0.035 0.232** 0.121
(-0.61) (4.19) (1.33)
M10%, 21 0.050 0.290** 0.389**
(0.90) (5.33) (3.27)
M1/3, 0 -0.003 0.151** 0.075
(-0.07) (3.24) (0.74)
M1/3, 21 0.002 0.210** 0.238**
(0.04) (4.60) (2.38)
MV10%, 0 0.012 0.193** 0.016
(0.40) (6.69) (0.25)
MV10%, 21 0.020 0.222** 0.130*
(0.67) (7.78) (2.08)
MV1/3, 0 -0.007 0.153** -0.027
(-0.27) (6.12) (-0.50)
MV1/3, 21 -0.004 0.182** 0.054
(-0.17) (7.42) (1.01)
V -0.011 0.155** -0.128**
(-0.70) (10.22) (-3.91)
Table 7
Regression coefficients between investment returns and two Fama-French factors, 
and the alphas for these investment strategies.
This table presents the results from the Regressions 10, 11 and 12. First column (Portfolio)
presents the nine different momentum, value and combination portfolios used in this study. The
second column presents the excess returns (alpha), third one the regression coefficients with
the market returns (beta of the fund) and the final column with the SMB factor.
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Interestingly, all of the investment strategies correlate positively and statistically significantly with 
the market returns     . This detail highlight the strong connections between market conditions 
and both momentum and value returns even when these investment strategies perform badly. 
 
5.2 Introducing liquidity 
The main focus of this thesis is reached by studying the role that liquidity plays with momentum 
and value returns. First, the connection between liquidity and both momentum and value returns are 
studied without any control variables and then the two control variables (     and SMB) are 
added. 
 
5.2.1 Uncontrolled liquidity: minor significance 
This section presents the results from the regressions 12, 13 and 14 where the momentum, value 
and combination portfolios returns are explained by the three different liquidity factors: liquidity 
level (L), the changes in liquidity (LC) and the liquidity shocks (LS). 
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The Table 8 presents a solid starting point for the study on the role that market liquidity play with 
momentum and value returns. Even as the results are somewhat ambiguous, they provide two major 
insights for this study. 
First, the initial results seem quite insignificant. This is quite an important starting point as the 
explanatory power of market liquidity seems rather weak without any control variables. This is very 
much expected, since previous studies have found only weak links between these factors and one 
shouldn't expect the market liquidity to be the only explanatory factor behind momentum and value 
investing returns. Second, the     is able to provide solidly significant returns with momentum 
portfolios where two results are statistically significant with a 5% level and one with a 1% level. As 
an interesting detail the most significant results are obtained from the         portfolio, where 21 
days waiting period is used before investing, minimizing the possible price reversal effect 
introduced earlier in this thesis and the 10% momentum portfolio is used where the stocks with 
Portfolio LTV LTO LCTV LCTO LSTV LSTO
M10%, 0 0.457 62.452* -7.110 -0.468 -0.066 -8.014
(1.67) (2.08) (-1.30) (-1.63) (-0.19) (-0.20)
M10%, 21 0.566* 83.651** -2.292 -0.229 0.217 32.600
(2.04) (2.76) (-0.41) (-0.79) (0.60) (0.79)
M1/3, 0 0.230 38.003 -8.127 -0.517* -0.241 -23.681
(1.01) (1.52) (-1.79) (-2.17) (-0.82) (-0.70)
M1/3, 21 0.350 59.620* -4.150 -0.312 0.013 14.277
(1.53) (2.38) (-0.91) (-1.30) (0.04) (0.42)
MV10%, 0 0.193 24.641 -2.659 -0.217 -0.006 -5.718
(1.32) (1.54) (-0.91) (-1.42) (-0.03) (-0.26)
MV10%, 21 0.247 35.240* -0.250 -0.097 0.136 14.589
(1.66) (2.16) (-0.08) (-0.62) (0.70) (0.66)
MV1/3, 0 0.079 12.417 -3.168 -0.241 -0.093 -13.551
(0.64) (0.91) (-1.27) (-1.85) (-0.58) (-0.73)
MV1/3, 21 0.139 23.225 -1.179 -0.139 0.034 5.428
(1.10) (1.68) (-0.47) (-1.05) (0.21) (0.29)
V -0.071 -13.170 1.792 0.034 0.054 -3.421
(-0.91) (-1.53) (1.14) (0.42) (0.53) (-0.29)
Table 8
Regression coefficients between momentum, value and combination portfolios with market liquidity factor (L), proportional 
liquidity change factor (LC) and liquidity shock factor (LS).
This table presents the results from the Regressions 12, 13 and 14 where portfolio returns (M, MV and V) are explained by the daily liquidity
factors (L, LC and LS). The regression uses today's portfolio returns as explained variable and the todays liquidity factor as an explanatory
factor without any control variables used.
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most extreme past returns are used when building the portfolio. This         portfolio should 
therefore be theoretically the portfolio with the strongest and clearest proxy for the momentum 
returns in general.  This is clearly something to look more deeply into and the next section 
introduce the control variables and start to build a more whole picture for these phenomena.  
 
5.2.2 Controlled liquidity: major significance 
This section introduces the control variables      and SMB are introduced and presents the 
findings from the Regressions 15, 16 and 17. 
 
 
 
Portfolio LTV LTO LCTV LCTO LSTV LSTO
M10%, 0 0.593* 85.265** -6.351 -0.376 0.078 29.397
(2.21) (2.88) (-1.18) (-1.33) (0.22) (0.72)
M10%, 21 0.742** 113.449** -1.593 -0.126 0.397 82.726*
(2.81) (3.91) (-0.30) (-0.45) (1.16) (2.07)
M1/3, 0 0.317 52.582* -7.607 -0.458 -0.148 -0.380
(1.4) (2.11) (-1.69) (-1.93) (-0.51) (-0.01)
M1/3, 21 0.475* 80.869** -3.592 -0.236 0.143 49.748
(2.14) (3.32) (-0.81) (-1.01) (0.5) (1.49)
MV10%, 0 0.301* 42.29** -1.834 -0.128 0.118 24.444
(2.14) (2.73) (-0.65) (-0.87) (0.65) (1.15)
MV10%, 21 0.375** 56.382** 0.545 -0.003 0.277 51.109*
(2.7) (3.7) (0.20) (-0.02) (1.54) (2.44)
MV1/3, 0 0.162 25.949 -2.462 -0.169 0.004 9.556
(1.34) (1.94) (-1.02) (-1.32) (0.03) (0.52)
MV1/3, 21 0.241* 40.092** -0.454 -0.058 0.150 34.620
(2.02) (3.05) (-0.19) (-0.46) (0.97) (1.92)
V 0.008 -0.685 2.683 0.121 0.157 19.492
(0.1) (-0.08) (1.83) (1.56) (1.65) (1.76)
Table 9
Regression coefficient between momentum, value and combination portfolios with market liquidity factor (L), proportional 
liquidity change factor (LC) and liquidity shock factor (LS) with Fama French two factors (Rm-f and SMB) as controlling 
variables.
This table presents the results from the Regressions 15, 16 and 17 where portfolio returns (M, MV and V) are explained by the daily liquidity
factors (L, LC and LS). The regression uses today's portfolio returns as explained variable and the today's liquidity factor as an explanatory
factor with the two Fama French factors (Rm-f and SMB) as controlling variables.
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Table 9 confirms the preliminary findings from the previous section (Section 5.2.1) showing the 
positive connection between daily momentum returns and market liquidity. Here the results are 
much stronger as seven out of eight momentum portfolios provide statistically significant results, 
four of them with even at a 1% confidence level. The only portfolio without significant results is the 
noisiest portfolio
26
        and even its results hint strongly towards a positive regression 
coefficient. Value, on the other hand, doesn't seem to load at all to the market liquidity. This also 
leads to much lower results with the combination portfolios MV's, but nevertheless, six out of eight 
of them also load positively on the market liquidity factor L.  
The real significance of this table is realized when comparing these controlled results more closely 
to the uncontrolled ones. Where the uncontrolled results are pretty much random, these results 
present quite steady positive results (16 out of 18 are positive). The best momentum factor (in terms 
of less noisy one)         and its combined portfolio with value           provide actually 
statistically significant result with both of the      measures. These results are not yet robust but 
provide a clear road sign on what to look at. 
 
5.3 From present to the past: lagged connections 
Up to this point, all of the results presented study the co-movement of daily momentum and value 
returns with the daily liquidity factors during the same day. From this point forward the 
fundamental viewpoint changes. 
The following chapter focuses on the affect that the past liquidity changes have on these investment 
results. In addition to the practical reasoning that some portfolio allocation forcing events, such as 
margin calls for leveraged traders, might take some time to take effect (next day) and the possibility 
of slow moving prices (from several possible market dynamic reasons), the most practically 
interesting part is: are there any arbitrage profits to be made or are the markets efficient. If the past 
liquidity changes can actually forecast the future returns for these investment strategies, this could 
be another small blow to the efficient market hypothesis and quite profitable news for arbitrageurs. 
                                                 
26
 This portfolio uses no lag period before investing and is hence more likely to suffer from different kinds of distorting 
effects and also, the one-third portfolio has less weight on the stocks most heavily presenting the past momentums 
(positives or negatives).  
49 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1 Uncontrolled correlations 
This section is similar to the Section 5.2.1 with one difference. Instead of using the day t's liquidity 
measures, the day t-1's measures are used instead. One could assume that the lagged liquidity 
changes would have lower impacts on investment returns but this section and the next one presents 
quite the opposite to be actually true. 
 
 
When we compare the results from the Table 10 (with the t-1 lagged liquidity) to the earlier Table 8 
(with the no lag period liquidity t) we can observe both the clear increase in the affect that the 
liquidity seems to have on momentum (increased correlation) and clearly improved statistical 
significance. 
Portfolio LTV LTO LCTV LCTO LSTV LSTO
M10%, 0 0.769** 108.828** 3.681 0.389 0.732* 149.483**
(2.82) (3.64) (0.67) (1.35) (2.07) (3.70)
M10%, 21 0.666* 107.012** 2.485 0.357 0.630 147.954**
(2.40) (3.54) (0.45) (1.23) (1.76) (3.61)
M1/3, 0 0.585* 84.823** 3.212 0.324 0.570 121.103**
(2.58) (3.41) (0.70) (1.35) (1.94) (3.60)
M1/3, 21 0.529* 86.074** 2.475 0.307 0.511 122.642**
(2.32) (3.46) (0.54) (1.28) (1.73) (3.64)
MV10%, 0 0.309* 46.472** 1.861 0.191 0.333 70.649**
(2.12) (2.91) (0.64) (1.25) (1.77) (3.28)
MV10%, 21 0.258 45.564** 1.264 0.176 0.282 69.884**
(1.73) (2.80) (0.42) (1.12) (1.46) (3.18)
MV1/3, 0 0.217 34.469* 1.627 0.159 0.252 56.459**
(1.75) (2.53) (0.65) (1.22) (1.56) (3.07)
MV1/3, 21 0.189 35.095* 1.258 0.151 0.222 57.228**
(1.50) (2.55) (0.50) (1.14) (1.36) (3.08)
V -0.151 -15.885 0.042 -0.006 -0.066 -8.185
(-1.93) (-1.85) (0.03) (-0.07) (-0.65) (-0.70)
This table presents the results from the Regressions 18, 19 and 20 (with one day lack) where portfolio returns (M, MV and V) are explained
by the t-1 liquidity factors (L, LC and LS). The regression uses today's portfolio returns as explained variable and the yesterdays liquidity
factor as an explanatory factor without any controlling variables.
Regression coefficients between momentum, value and combination portfolios with t-1 market liquidity factor (L), 
proportional liquidity change factor (LC) and liquidity shock factor (LS).
Table 10
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The relationship between market liquidity factors (L) and momentum factors are statistically 
significant with both liquidity proxies and with all four momentum portfolios studied. The lagged 
market liquidity clearly forecasts a part of the future momentum profits. The results from the value 
portfolio still stay statistically insignificant. These results are even more interesting since the results 
in Table 10 are obtained from the non-controlled regressions. The next section adds the control 
variables to this regression and demonstrates further improvement in the explanatory power. 
 
5.3.2 Controlled correlations: strong evidence 
This section follows the same structure as section 5.2.2 in all other details than the similar t-1 time 
period used for liquidity factors as in the last part 5.3.1. This section presents the strong relations 
between momentum portfolio returns and both market liquidity (L) and liquidity shocks (LS). 
 
Portfolio LTV LTO LCTV LCTO LSTV LSTO
M10%, 0 0.864** 113.428** 5.980 0.505 0.867* 162.568**
(3.23) (3.89) (1.11) (1.79) (2.50) (4.11)
M10%, 21 0.801** 113.528** 5.772 0.522 0.825* 166.387**
(3.05) (3.96) (1.09) (1.88) (2.42) (4.29)
M1/3, 0 0.644** 87.696** 4.644 0.397 0.654* 129.326**
(2.87) (3.57) (1.03) (1.68) (2.24) (3.89)
M1/3, 21 0.623** 90.607** 4.755 0.422 0.645* 135.501**
(2.83) (3.77) (1.07) (1.82) (2.26) (4.17)
MV10%, 0 0.376** 49.777** 3.504 0.276 0.427* 80.009**
(2.69) (3.26) (1.25) (1.88) (2.36) (3.87)
MV10%, 21 0.345* 49.827** 3.400 0.286 0.406* 81.919**
(2.49) (3.30) (1.22) (1.95) (2.26) (4.01)
MV1/3, 0 0.266* 36.911** 2.836 0.221 0.32* 63.389**
(2.21) (2.80) (1.17) (1.75) (2.05) (3.55)
MV1/3, 21 0.255* 38.367** 2.892 0.234 0.316* 66.476**
(2.15) (2.95) (1.21) (1.87) (2.05) (3.79)
V -0.112 -13.874 1.029 0.046 -0.014 -2.549
(-1.53) (-1.73) (0.70) (0.60) (-0.14) (-0.23)
Table 11
Regression coefficients between momentum, value and combination portfolios with t-1 market liquidity factor (L), 
proportional liquidity change factor (LC) and liquidity shock factor (LS) with Fama French two factors (Rm-f and SMB) as 
controlling variables.
This table presents the results from the Regressions 21, 22 and 23 (with one day lack) where portfolio returns (M, MV and V) are explained
by the t-1 liquidity factors (L, LC and LS). The regression uses today's portfolio returns as explained variable and the yesterdays liquidity
factor as an explanatory factor with the today's two Fama French factors (Rm-f and SMB) as controlling variables.
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The Table 11 verifies the earlier findings and provides extremely strong results for momentum 
returns. First focusing on the momentum (M) and combination (MV) portfolios shows that all of the 
regression coefficients between these portfolios and market liquidity factors (both     and    ) are 
positive and statistically significant. All of the results from momentum portfolios (M) are actually 
significant with the 1% level. Second, the results for liquidity change factors (LC) are all 
statistically insignificant. Third, the results from liquidity shock factors (LS) are all significant, 
especially the relationship with      where the significance level is 1% with all of the studied 
momentum (M) and combination portfolios (MV). 
The results presented in Table 11 can be viewed as the main results from this study. First, the 
evidence clearly supports the hypothesis of link between momentum investment returns and market 
liquidity. Second, unexpected shocks (LS) rather than the expected liquidity changes (LS) seem to 
contribute to the momentum returns. Third, there seems to be an opposite signed relation between 
value portfolio (V) and liquidity factors (L) than between the momentum portfolios (M) and 
liquidity factors (L). This relationship is however much weaker and still statistically insignificant. 
The first two results are in line with the previous study by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) who 
present that the past trading volume predicts the magnitude of the momentum effect and that most 
of the excess returns in volume-based investment strategies rise due to the changes in trading 
volume, rather than its static levels itself. 
Another interesting detail is the positive correlation between momentum returns and market 
liquidity as it’s actually the contrary than the results from Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2008) 
who found the predictability to diminish as liquidity improves. They conclude that these results are 
in line with the hypothesis of increasing arbitrage activity during liquid times and the enhancement 
of market efficiency. Also the results from Roll, Schwartz and Subrahmanyam (2007) present 
evidence that suggests that the liquidity enhances the future-cash pricing systems efficiency i.e. the 
improvement in liquidity decreases the profitable arbitrage situations. It seems that the daily 
correlations might actually differ from the longer time horizon correlations. 
One possible explanation for these differences in the results could be the, almost self evident, 
intuition that if market liquidity is considered to consist of two parts, real friction and informational 
friction, presented by Stoll (2000), there should also be two different “categories” of liquidity: 
constant (or changeable in the long run) and marginal. If this holds, the relationship between daily 
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liquidity and arbitrage returns should differ from the relationship with the longer time periods 
(monthly, quarterly etc.). In practice this means that in the short run market makers only focus on 
the marginal costs when balancing their positions, but on the long run they can exit the markets if 
the marginal profitability doesn't cover the long run costs (computers, offices, staff etc.). This 
setting gives the findings from this study a slightly different undertone than the previous studies 
with monthly time horizon. As the affect from the short term liquidity shocks are studied here, the 
market makers actually reveal their marginal costs in this setting unlike the longer time periods 
overall costs studied in most of the previous studies. 
 
5.4 Prolonged effect: evidence for lagged relation 
Based on the earlier results it seems clear that there is some time varying effects between the factors 
studied. It seems reasonable to study the lagged effects little closer and this section studies the 
lagged effect that liquidity changes have on momentum and value investment returns. Four new lag 
periods are introduced: t-2, t-3, t-4 and t-5 and hence, the effects of daily liquidity and its changes 
are studied up to a one week time period. 
Three tables present these results. The first table (Table 12) presents the results from the daily 
liquidity (L), the second table (Table 13) presents the results from the proportional liquidity 
changes (LC) and the third table (Table 14) presents the results from the liquidity shock factor (LS). 
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The Table 12 above presents a very interesting picture on the nature of market liquidity's 
explanatory power over the studied momentum (M), value (V) and combination (MV) portfolios. 
There are clear peaks in regression coefficient and the statistical significance in all of the portfolios. 
With the momentum (M) and combination (MV) portfolios there is a clear increase in the 
explanatory power that starts immediately at the time t, peak at the lag period t-1, diminishes at the 
t-2 and turns practically to a random variable after that. Value (V) on the other hand, starts to show 
the connection in the t-1, peak at the t-2, still somewhat persist in to t-3 and vanish completely only 
at the t-4. More interestingly, the t-2 and t-3 periods are actually able to produce statistically 
significant results for the value portfolio (V), something that was not observed in previous chapters. 
These results are remarkable in two ways. First, there seems to be clear lagged relationship between 
these factors and second, the relation is opposite for the momentum (M) and value (V) portfolios. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2, present the results from the Table 12 in a graphical form. 
Portfolio LTV (t) LTV (t-1) LTV (t-2) LTV (t-3) LTV (t-4) LTV (t-5) LTO (t) LTO (t-1) LTO (t-2) LTO (t-3) LTO (t-4) LTO (t-5)
M10%, 0 0.593* 0.864** 0.597* 0.271 0.346 0.092 85.265** 113.428** 48.465 2.843 -5.913 -26.654
(2.21) (3.23) (2.22) (1.00) (1.28) (0.33) (2.88) (3.89) (1.64) (0.10) (-0.20) (-0.90)
M10%, 21 0.742** 0.801** 0.543* 0.213 0.334 0.088 113.449** 113.528** 46.352 -1.227 -1.617 -22.996
(2.81) (3.05) (2.06) (0.80) (1.25) (0.32) (3.91) (3.96) (1.60) (-0.04) (-0.06) (-0.79)
M1/3, 0 0.317 0.644** 0.436 0.205 0.232 0.037 52.582* 87.696** 33.407 2.439 -6.510 -23.677
(1.4) (2.87) (1.93) (0.90) (1.02) (0.16) (2.11) (3.57) (1.35) (0.10) (-0.26) (-0.95)
M1/3, 21 0.475* 0.623** 0.409 0.187 0.267 0.071 80.869** 90.607** 32.925 1.511 0.908 -17.238
(2.14) (2.83) (1.85) (0.84) (1.20) (0.31) (3.32) (3.77) (1.36) (0.06) (0.04) (-0.70)
MV10%, 0 0.301* 0.376** 0.220 0.066 0.170 0.034 42.29** 49.777** 15.543 -6.940 -5.003 -14.237
(2.14) (2.69) (1.57) (0.47) (1.20) (0.24) (2.73) (3.26) (1.01) (-0.45) (-0.32) (-0.92)
MV10%, 21 0.375** 0.345* 0.193 0.037 0.164 0.032 56.382** 49.827** 14.487 -8.975 -2.856 -12.408
(2.7) (2.49) (1.39) (0.26) (1.17) (0.23) (3.7) (3.30) (0.95) (-0.59) (-0.19) (-0.81)
MV1/3, 0 0.162 0.266* 0.140 0.033 0.113 0.007 25.949 36.911** 8.014 -7.142 -5.302 -12.748
(1.34) (2.21) (1.15) (0.27) (0.93) (0.05) (1.94) (2.80) (0.60) (-0.54) (-0.40) (-0.95)
MV1/3, 21 0.241* 0.255* 0.126 0.024 0.131 0.024 40.092** 38.367** 7.773 -7.606 -1.593 -9.529
(2.02) (2.15) (1.06) (0.20) (1.09) (0.19) (3.05) (2.95) (0.59) (-0.58) (-0.12) (-0.72)
V 0.008 -0.112 -0.157* -0.139 -0.006 -0.023 -0.685 -13.874 -17.378* -16.723* -4.094 -1.820
(0.1) (-1.53) (-2.13) (-1.89) (-0.08) (-0.31) (-0.08) (-1.73) (-2.16) (-2.08) (-0.51) (-0.22)
Table 12
Market liquidity's (L) prolonged effects on momentum (M), value (V) and combination (MV) portfolio returns.
This table presents the results from the Regressions 21, 22 and 23 (with zero to five day lacks) where momentum (M), value (V) and combination (MV) portfolios returns are studied
against lacked liquidity (L) while the two Fama French factors (Rm-f and SMB) are used as controlling variables. First columns present the regression coefficient between today's portfolio
returns and the t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4 and t-5 present the past liquidity of previous five trading dates.
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This figure presents the correlations from today's and five previous days' market liquidity
measure (LTV) from the Regressions 21, 22 and 23. The momentum portfolios (M) are blue,
combination portfolios (MV) are red and the value portfolio (V) is the black line.
Prolonged effects of market liquidity (LTV)
Figure 1
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These two figures above (Figure 1 and Figure 2) show the difference in the regression coefficients 
between market liquidity factors (    and    ) and the nine portfolio returns studied. Both of the 
tables show the same two major effects. First, the significant positive connection between 
momentum (M) and combination (MV) portfolios with the liquidity factors     and     that starts 
at the same day t and diminishes after t-2. And second, the negative connection between value (V) 
returns and the liquidity factors     and     that starts in the t-1 and peaks at the t-3. 
An explanation for the lag period presented can be derived from Stoll (2000) where market friction 
is divided into two parts: real friction and informational friction. Since the real friction takes some 
time to adapt to, it should cause some time lag to the net profitability changes for the market 
makers. For example, the increase in market liquidity can increase their ability to borrow cheaper or 
the decrease in market liquidity can trigger marking calls. Both of these effects may however take 
some time to take place and lead to lagged reaction to market liquidity changes. 
This figure presents the correlations from today's and five previous days' market liquidity
measure (LTO) from the Regressions 21, 22 and 23. The momentum portfolios (M) are blue,
combination portfolios (MV) are red and the value portfolio (V) is the black line.
Prolonged effects of market liquidity (LTO)
Figure 2
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The following table, Table 13, presents the results from the prolonged affect from proportional 
liquidity changes (LC).   
 
The results from Table 13 stands as an evidence for the second hypothesis studied in this thesis. 
There seems to be no clear connection between the expected liquidity changes (LC) and momentum 
(M), value (V) and combination (MV) portfolios. These results are very well in line with the 
theoretical framework of the "liquidity anomaly" i.e. the autoregressive cyclical nature of liquidity 
(e.g. Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). They argue that the liquidity 
anomaly is in matter of a fact self-perpetuating, as if when investors find out about the lower 
liquidity they should rationally avoid trading during those times, which would even further reduce 
the liquidity. This can lead to market dynamics where the expected liquidity changes (LC) can be 
anticipated and priced beforehand and only the unexpected liquidity shocks (LS) will trigger an 
immediate price reaction. 
Portfolio LCTV (t) LCTV (t-1) LCTV (t-2) LCTV (t-3) LCTV (t-4) LCTV (t-5) LCTO (t) LCTO (t-1) LCTO (t-2) LCTO (t-3) LCTO (t-4) LCTO (t-5)
M10%, 0 -6.351 5.980 7.208 -1.918 5.797 1.224 -0.376 0.505 0.312 -0.231 0.125 0.052
(-1.18) (1.11) (1.34) (-0.36) (1.07) (0.21) (-1.33) (1.79) (1.10) (-0.82) (0.44) (0.18)
M10%, 21 -1.593 5.772 7.242 -2.897 5.582 -0.058 -0.126 0.522 0.271 -0.267 0.126 0.002
(-0.30) (1.09) (1.37) (-0.55) (1.05) (-0.01) (-0.45) (1.88) (0.98) (-0.96) (0.45) (0.01)
M1/3, 0 -7.607 4.644 5.041 -0.823 4.417 0.695 -0.458 0.397 0.151 -0.165 0.086 0.017
(-1.69) (1.03) (1.11) (-0.18) (0.97) (0.14) (-1.93) (1.68) (0.64) (-0.70) (0.36) (0.07)
M1/3, 21 -3.592 4.755 4.780 -1.958 4.465 -0.232 -0.236 0.422 0.110 -0.216 0.094 -0.029
(-0.81) (1.07) (1.08) (-0.44) (1.00) (-0.05) (-1.01) (1.82) (0.47) (-0.93) (0.40) (-0.12)
MV10%, 0 -1.834 3.504 3.380 -2.443 3.103 1.834 -0.128 0.276 0.141 -0.170 0.066 0.076
(-0.65) (1.25) (1.20) (-0.87) (1.10) (0.62) (-0.87) (1.88) (0.95) (-1.16) (0.44) (0.50)
MV10%, 21 0.545 3.400 3.397 -2.933 2.996 1.194 -0.003 0.286 0.120 -0.188 0.066 0.051
(0.20) (1.22) (1.22) (-1.06) (1.07) (0.40) (-0.02) (1.95) (0.82) (-1.29) (0.45) (0.34)
MV1/3, 0 -2.462 2.836 2.296 -1.896 2.413 1.570 -0.169 0.221 0.060 -0.137 0.046 0.058
(-1.02) (1.17) (0.95) (-0.78) (0.99) (0.61) (-1.32) (1.75) (0.47) (-1.08) (0.36) (0.45)
MV1/3, 21 -0.454 2.892 2.166 -2.463 2.437 1.107 -0.058 0.234 0.040 -0.163 0.051 0.036
(-0.19) (1.21) (0.91) (-1.03) (1.01) (0.44) (-0.46) (1.87) (0.32) (-1.30) (0.40) (0.28)
V 2.683 1.029 -0.448 -2.969* 0.409 2.445 0.121 0.046 -0.031 -0.109 0.007 0.100
(1.83) (0.70) (-0.30) (-2.02) (0.28) (1.57) (1.56) (0.60) (-0.40) (-1.42) (0.09) (1.27)
Table 13
Proportional liquidity changes (LC) prolonged effects on momentum (M), value (V) and combination (MV) portfolio returns.
This table presents the results from the Regressions 21, 22 and 23 (with zero to five days lack) where momentum (M), value (V) and combination (MV) portfolios returns are studied
against lacked proportional liquidity change factor (LC) while the two Fama French factors (Rm-f and SMB) are used as controlling variables. First columns present the correlation
between today's portfolio returns and the t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4 and t-5 present the past liquidity of previous five trading dates.
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The third table from the prolonged affect, the Table 14 above, demonstrates similar relations as the 
Table 12 from the market liquidity (L) part. There are statistically significant results between the 
liquidity shocks (LS) and all of the portfolios studied. 
The regression coefficient peaks at the t-1 for the momentum (M) and combination (MB) portfolios 
and at t-3 for the value (V) portfolio. The results are statistically significant and of opposite 
direction for the momentum (M) and value (V) portfolios. It seems that the liquidity shocks (LS) 
increase the momentum returns (M) at first and then diminish the value returns (V). 
The importance of studying the prolonged (or lagged) affect of these factors is clear. When a one 
day lag period is added, the results from momentum returns rise significantly, but only after 
studying the 5 day prolonged affect we discover the significant results from the value returns. 
These findings are in line with the results from Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) as the 
liquidity shocks seem to correlate positively with momentum returns and negatively with value 
returns. These results therefore confirm the monthly results (ibid.) also in the daily level. 
One explanation for these findings could be that the unexpected increase in liquidity allows the 
arbitrageurs to enter momentum investments as the net profitability of these investments increases. 
Portfolio LSTV (t) LSTV (t-1) LSTV (t-2) LSTV (t-3) LSTV (t-4) LSTV (t-5) LSTO (t) LSTO (t-1) LSTO (t-2) LSTO (t-3) LSTO (t-4) LSTO (t-5)
M10%, 0 0.078 0.867* 0.664 0.140 0.484 0.008 29.397 162.568** 88.487* 21.436 26.098 -21.866
(0.22) (2.50) (1.91) (0.40) (1.39) (0.02) (0.72) (4.11) (2.22) (0.54) (0.65) (-0.53)
M10%, 21 0.397 0.825* 0.626 0.054 0.452 -0.104 82.726* 166.387** 86.589* 8.601 28.005 -31.508
(1.16) (2.42) (1.83) (0.16) (1.32) (-0.29) (2.07) (4.29) (2.21) (0.22) (0.71) (-0.78)
M1/3, 0 -0.148 0.654* 0.486 0.139 0.351 -0.017 -0.380 129.326** 61.561 20.033 20.477 -19.265
(-0.51) (2.24) (1.66) (0.48) (1.20) (-0.06) (-0.01) (3.89) (1.84) (0.60) (0.61) (-0.56)
M1/3, 21 0.143 0.645* 0.444 0.071 0.360 -0.093 49.748 135.501** 58.465 8.944 24.045 -27.402
(0.5) (2.26) (1.55) (0.25) (1.26) (-0.31) (1.49) (4.17) (1.78) (0.27) (0.73) (-0.81)
MV10%, 0 0.118 0.427* 0.259 -0.040 0.265 0.062 24.444 80.009** 36.888 -2.295 12.784 -3.760
(0.65) (2.36) (1.43) (-0.22) (1.46) (0.32) (1.15) (3.87) (1.77) (-0.11) (0.61) (-0.18)
MV10%, 21 0.277 0.406* 0.240 -0.083 0.249 0.006 51.109* 81.919** 35.939 -8.712 13.737 -8.581
(1.54) (2.26) (1.34) (-0.46) (1.39) (0.03) (2.44) (4.01) (1.75) (-0.42) (0.67) (-0.41)
MV1/3, 0 0.004 0.32* 0.170 -0.040 0.199 0.049 9.556 63.389** 23.425 -2.996 9.974 -2.459
(0.03) (2.05) (1.09) (-0.25) (1.27) (0.30) (0.52) (3.55) (1.30) (-0.17) (0.56) (-0.13)
MV1/3, 21 0.150 0.316* 0.149 -0.074 0.203 0.011 34.620 66.476** 21.877 -8.541 11.757 -6.528
(0.97) (2.05) (0.97) (-0.48) (1.32) (0.07) (1.92) (3.79) (1.24) (-0.48) (0.66) (-0.36)
V 0.157 -0.014 -0.145 -0.219* 0.047 0.115 19.492 -2.549 -14.711 -26.026* -0.530 14.347
(1.65) (-0.14) (-1.53) (-2.31) (0.49) (1.16) (1.76) (-0.23) (-1.35) (-2.40) (-0.05) (1.28)
Table 14
Liquidity shocks (LS) prolonged effects on momentum (M), value (V) and combination (MV) portfolio returns.
This table presents the results from the Regressions 21, 22 and 23 (with zero to five day lacks) where momentum (M), value (V) and combination (MV) portfolios returns are studied
against lacked liquidity shock factor (LS) while the two Fama French factors (Rm-f and SMB) are used as controlling variables. First columns present the regression coefficient between
today's portfolio returns and the t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4 and t-5 present the past liquidity of previous five trading dates.
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This sudden flow of arbitrage money can then drive up prices for these stocks and thus cause this 
phenomenon. 
The opposite reactions for momentum and value returns can be explained by simple portfolio 
overlapping. Since both momentum and value investment portfolios are built using market prices, 
the changes in these prices affect the allocation for both of these strategies and this effect is in the 
opposite direction. The increase (decrease) in market value of a stock increase its past returns and 
lead to a long (short) position in momentum investment strategy. Similar increase (decrease) in 
market value will on the other hand decrease the book-to-market ratio and lead to a short (long) 
position in the value investment portfolio. The negative correlation between liquidity shocks and 
value returns can therefore be caused by the negatively overlapping portfolio allocation. 
Another explanation might be that value returns rise from an unobserved rational risk factor 
(Zhang, 2005). This removes the anomaly state from the value effect and verify its rationality as a 
part of the efficient markets. The reasoning is quite straightforward, if value returns are not an 
anomaly and should be present at the markets but the momentum returns are an anomaly, the 
increase of market efficiency (and liquidity) should diminish the momentum returns but actually 
increase the value returns. 
More questions rise when comparing these results to the results by Amihud (2002) as it presents 
that the expected illiquidity has a positive effect on expected stock returns but the unexpected 
changes has a negative effect. The results present the correlation from daily liquidity and liquidity 
shocks to be of the same direction (positive with the momentum returns and negative with the value 
returns). This difference in returns can be due to the fact that this study focuses on studying the 
market anomaly returns where Amihud (2002) studies the individual stock returns. One possible 
explanation can be derived from results from Pastor Stambaugh (2003) where the stock returns in 
general are found to be cross-sectionally related to their sensitivity in aggregate market liquidity. 
This can lead to market dynamics where the changes in liquidity can cause short term price 
movements in stock prices that can induce these interestingly spurious results. 
The following two figures, Figure 3 and Figure 4, present the results from Table 14 in a graphical 
form and demonstrate the lagged and prolonged affect that the liquidity shocks (LS) have on the 
momentum (M), value (V) and combination (MV) portfolios. 
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Figure 3
This figure presents the correlations from today's and five previous days' liquidity shock measure
(LSTV) from the Regressions 21, 22 and 23. The momentum portfolios (M) are blue, combination
portfolios (MV) are red and the value portfolio (V) is the black line.
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These figures above, Figure 3 and Figure 4, present the slow moving, lagged and prolonged, affect 
that the liquidity shocks (LS) have on momentum (M), value (V) and combination (MV) portfolios. 
The same time structure, of instantaneous positive effect on momentum and two to three days 
lagged negative effect on value, are observable as in the Figures 1 and 2 presenting the effects on 
market liquidity’s (L) parts. 
The evidence for slowly moving price effect seems quite clear, but what really drives these effects? 
The next section divides the liquidity shock (LS) factors to six parts and demonstrates that the 
positive liquidity shocks are the driving force behind this phenomenon. 
 
This figure presents the correlations from today's and five previous days' liquidity shock measure
(LSTO) from the Regressions 21, 22 and 23. The momentum portfolios (M) are blue, combination
portfolios (MV) are red and the value portfolio (V) is the black line.
Prolonged effects of liquidity shocks (LSTO)
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5.5 The dummy approach: the positive shocks dominate 
This section studies the liquidity shocks (LS) effect more closely and reveals that the positive 
liquidity shocks, rather than the negative ones, are the driving force behind the results presented in 
the previous sections. A new dummy variable is introduced for the liquidity shocks (LS). 
The dummy variables are obtained by ranking the liquidity shocks (LS) into six categories:     
dummy for the major negative shocks,     for the minor negative shock,     for all the negative 
shocks,     for all of the positive shocks,     for the minor positive shocks and      for the manor 
positive shocks. The cut-off values for these shocks are set ex-post as roughly one standard 
deviation and half of the standard deviation apart from the zero
27
. This division is made to study 
more closely which kind of shocks contribute to the results. 
The following two tables, Table 15 and Table 16, present the explanatory power of the most 
effective liquidity shock (LS) measures obtained in the previous sections. The t-1 time period is 
used for the momentum (M) and combination (MV) portfolios and t-3 for the value portfolio (V) as 
the liquidity shocks (LS) affect on these portfolio returns occurs during these time periods. 
 
                                                 
27
 The dummy variables got the value 1 if the liquidity shock exceeded their cut-off value i.e. the minor shock factors 
include also the major shock factors as it also exceeds the minor shock cut-off etc. The twelve dummy variables got the 
value 1 in the following percentages of times: trading volume dummies,       10%,       24%,       50%,       
50%,       25% and        12%. And the turnover dummies       9%       26%,       56%,       44%,       
22% and      12%. 
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Portfolio DTV-2 DTV-1 DTV-0 DTV+0 DTV+1 DTV+2
M10%, 0 -0.345 -0.239 -0.225* 0.225* 0.297* 0.535**
(-1.87) (-1.80) (-1.99) (1.99) (2.28) (3.07)
M10%, 21 -0.293 -0.249 -0.216 0.216 0.270* 0.393*
(-1.61) (-1.92) (-1.94) (1.94) (2.11) (2.29)
M1/3, 0 -0.275 -0.166 -0.148 0.148 0.217* 0.404*
(-1.77) (-1.50) (-1.56) (1.56) (1.98) (2.76)
M1/3, 21 -0.266 -0.185 -0.147 0.147 0.204 0.290*
(-1.75) (-1.70) (-1.57) (1.57) (1.90) (2.02)
MV10%, 0 -0.172 -0.114 -0.123* 0.123* 0.161* 0.244**
(-1.78) (-1.65) (-2.09) (2.09) (2.37) (2.68)
MV10%, 21 -0.146 -0.119 -0.119* 0.119* 0.148* 0.119
(-1.53) (-1.75) (-2.04) (2.04) (2.20) (1.91)
MV1/3, 0 -0.137 -0.078 -0.085 0.085 0.121* 0.178*
(-1.64) (-1.31) (-1.67) (1.67) (2.06) (2.27)
MV1/3, 21 -0.133 -0.087 -0.084 0.084 0.115* 0.121
(-1.62) (-1.49) (-1.68) (1.68) (1.98) (1.56)
V -0.042 0.077* 0.079* -0.079* -0.096** -0.098*
(-0.82) (2.15) (2.58) (-2.58) (-2.71) (-2.06)
Table 15
Explanatory power of the dummy variables (DTV).
This table presents the regression coefficients between the six different dummy variables (DTV) and the
momentum (M), value (V) and combination portfolio (MV) returns. The dummy variables used here are
obtained from the liquidity shock (LS) factor from the trading volume factor (TV). They rank from the -2
to the +2 where the -2 includes the most extreme negative shocks and the +2 the most extreme positive
shocks, as defined earlier in this chapter.
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Both of the tables above, Table 15 and Table 16, provide the same picture. The positive liquidity 
shocks forecast the future returns (t+1 for momentum and t+3 for value). These positive shocks 
seem to anticipate positive momentum (M) returns for the next trading date and negative returns for 
the value (V) investments for the third trading date after the liquidity shock (LS). 
The relationship between the negative liquidity shocks (LS) seems to be much lower both in the 
magnitude of the correlation and the statistical significance. However, the regression coefficients 
Portfolio DTO-2 DTO-1 DTO-0 DTO+0 DTO+1 DTO+2
M10%, 0 -0.258 -0.226 -0.279* 0.279* 0.429** 0.612**
(-1.32) (-1.76) (-2.45) (2.45) (3.12) (3.50)
M10%, 21 -0.296 -0.250* -0.246* 0.246* 0.416** 0.561**
(-1.54) (-1.98) (-2.20) (2.20) (3.08) (3.26)
M1/3, 0 -0.171 -0.182 -0.215* 0.215* 0.331** 0.447**
(-1.04) (-1.69) (-2.25) (2.25) (2.86) (3.04)
M1/3, 21 -0.222 -0.208* -0.187* 0.187* 0.315** 0.406**
(-1.38) (-1.97) (-1.99) (1.99) (2.78) (2.81)
MV10%, 0 -0.114 -0.110 -0.161** 0.161** 0.225** 0.296**
(-1.11) (-1.65) (-2.71) (2.71) (3.13) (3.24)
MV10%, 21 -0.132 -0.122 -0.144* 0.144* 0.218** 0.270**
(-1.32) (-1.85) (-2.45) (2.45) (3.07) (2.99)
MV1/3, 0 -0.070 -0.088 -0.129* 0.129* 0.176** 0.213**
(-0.80) (-1.53) (-2.52) (2.52) (2.83) (2.70)
MV1/3, 21 -0.095 -0.102 -0.115* 0.115* 0.168** 0.193*
(-1.10) (-1.79) (-2.27) (2.27) (2.75) (2.47)
V 0.015 0.060 0.036 -0.036 -0.114** -0.121*
(0.28) (1.71) (1.16) (-1.16) (-3.03) (-2.54)
This table presents the regression coefficients between the six different dummy variables (DTO) and the
momentum (M), value (V) and combination portfolio (MV) returns. The dummy variables used here are
obtained from the liquidity shock (LS) factor from the turnover factor (TO). They rank from the -2 to the
+2 where the -2 includes the most extreme negative shocks and the +2 the most extreme positive shocks,
as defined earlier in this chapter.
Table 16
Explanatory power of the dummy variables (DTO).
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with the negative shocks are opposite than the positive shocks for both momentum (M) and value 
(V) and over a quarter of the negative shocks are statistically significant (15 out of 54). 
The explanatory power of the liquidity shock dummy variable reach statistically significant levels 
with the combination portfolio (MV), especially for the positive shock parts where 20 out of 24 
results are statistically significant. 
The following two figures, Figure 5 and Figure 6, present the regression coefficients from the 
dummy variables in a graphical form. 
 
 
This figure presents the correlation coefficients between the six dummy variables for market
liquidity shocks (LSTV): DTV-2, DTV-1, DTV-0, DTV+0, DTV+1 and DTV+2. The momentum portfolios
(M) are blue, combination portfolios (MV) are red and the value portfolio (V) is the black line.
Explanatory power of trading volume dummies (DTV)
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Figure 5 and Figure 6 present clear positive connection with momentum (M) and combination 
(MV) portfolios and a negative connection with value portfolio (V). These regression coefficients 
are strongest with positive liquidity shocks and also the most statistically significant. 
These results contribute to the earlier results by Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) by 
demonstrating the very same relationship between these measures, but from the daily data instead 
of the monthly data, and by showing that these results are mainly driven by positive liquidity 
shocks rather than the negative ones. 
If the positive liquidity shocks are the driving force behind these relations, what is the market 
dynamic that causes it? The results could can rise due to several reasons. The most practical 
explanation is a small capital buffer used by arbitrage investors. If the capital flow to arbitrage 
investors is the fundamental reason behind these changes, a simple risk buffer by these investors 
Figure 6
Explanatory power of turnover dummies (DTO)
This figure presents the correlation coefficients between the six dummy variables for market
liquidity shocks (LSTO): DTO-2, DTO-1, DTO-0, DTO+0, DTO+1 and DTO+2. The momentum portfolios
(M) are blue, combination portfolios (MV) are red and the value portfolio (V) is the black line.
-0.400
-0.300
-0.200
-0.100
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
0.600
DTO-2 DTO-1 DTO-0 DTO+0 DTO+1 DTO+2
M10%, 0
M10%, 21
M1/3, 0
M1/3, 21
MV10%, 0
MV10%, 21
MV1/3, 0
MV1/3, 21
V
66 
 
 
 
can explain the results that these effects are driven by positive liquidity shocks. If investors keep 
some excess capital buffer they can avoid forced sell-offs which were offered as an explanation by 
Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013). In this setting, increase in their capital allows an 
immediate increase in their investments and the small negative shocks can be absorbed by their 
capital buffers and won’t force them into immediate sell-offs. This leads to a dynamic where 
positive shocks cause immediate reaction but negative shocks are mostly absorbed by capital 
buffers. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This study focus on the links between market liquidity and two of the most studied stock market 
anomalies: momentum effect and value effect. 
First, there are no positive alphas for momentum or value investment strategies during the post 
2008 financial crisis period. This is in line with the previous findings of diminishing anomaly 
investment strategy returns (Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Tong, 2013). 
Second, the results from Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) are confirmed using the daily 
stock market data and similar negative relationship between liquidity shocks and value investment 
returns, and a positive relationship between liquidity shocks and momentum investment returns are 
confirmed. 
Third, the unexpected liquidity shocks, rather than the expected ones, forecast the value and 
momentum investment returns. The unexpected liquidity shocks correlate positively with 
momentum returns. This connection starts to show immediately, peaks at the t-1 and diminishes 
after the t-2. Value, on the other hand, correlates negatively with the unexpected liquidity shocks 
and this effect is not realized immediately. This effect is statistically significant only at the t-2 and 
t-3 days. 
And finally, positive liquidity shocks seem to be the driving force behind these phenomena. This 
disproves the forced sell-off argumentation offered by Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) and 
raises a question on the exact market dynamic causing this effect. One explanation could be the 
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capital flows to arbitrage investors who keep some capital buffer. This would allow them to absorb 
some of the negative shocks but to invest immediately after most of the positive ones.   
All in all, the results clearly show that unexpected liquidity shocks predict both momentum and 
value investment returns. These results open up many new directions for future studies. First, there 
seems to be obvious new avenues for both daily and intraday data usage when analyzing the role 
that stock market liquidity plays in explaining different market anomalies. Second, the time 
structure in the relationship between stock market liquidity raises the need for further studies on 
slow moving prices. And finally, the further studies to clarify the role of arbitrage investors and the 
effect of capital flows to these investors. 
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